Revenue sharing : minorities and the poor. by Collins, Paula Robinson
REVENUE SHARING:
MINORITIES AND THE POOR
by
PAULA ROBINSON COLLINS
B.A., Mount Holyoke
1971
College
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF
CITY PLANNING
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY
June 1975
Signature of Author...... ...................
Department of Urban Studies
Certified by..
Accepted by..
and Planning
Mdy 15, 1975
... ... ... ..-'.... . - - -. -
Thesis Supervisor
...............- -. '- - -.-......-.
Chairman, Departmental Committee
on Graduate Students-'
R~ofeff
JUN 30 1975'
ABSTRACT
REVENUE SHARING:
MINORITIES AND THE POOR
by
PAULA ROBINSON COLLINS
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies
and Planning on May 27, 1975 in partial ful-
fillment of the requirements for the degree.
of Master of City Planning
This thesis is a result of a continued interest in
the local effects of federal aid programs. General and
Special Revenue Sharing are the latest in a series of
domestic policies aimed at restoring the power of state and
local governments. As has sometimes been the case with
past programs, such empowerment of local bureaucracies
and officials is accomplished at the expense of low-income
and minority constituencies.
Substantive changes in the overall revenue sharing
program can mitigate its adverse impacts. Revision of the
method by which funds are distributed to state and local
governments, and clarification of the eligibility require-
ments for those governments can help insure that funds are
allocated in a more equitable manner.
Strengthening of the management capabilities of
officials who administer revenue sharing locally, can
further a more efficient and responsible use of scarce
revenue sharing resources. Strengthening of regulations
regarding civil rights, as well as the categories of uses
for which revenue sharing money can be spent is a crucial
step toward fostering local responsiveness to the needs of
poor people and racial minorities.
Broadened citizen access to those same funding and
policy decisions can make revenue sharing more accountabl..e
to public interests.
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I.
Implicit in these revisions is the need for a shift
in program focus, away from bolstering the status quo and
leaving intact historical socio-economic inequities, toward
acting as a catalyst for long-term reforms such as income
redistribution and revision of regressive tax practices.
The federal government must play the leading role in
affecting -these changes. Without extensive revisions in both
the revenue sharing and the fiscal system in which it
operates, continued funding of this program only exacer-
bates the gap between the haves and the have nots in America.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Tunney Lee
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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PREFACE
General Sharing is an aid program which transfers
money from the federal government to thousands of state and
local governments. Established in 1972 by the State and
Local Fiscal Assistance Act, General Revenue Sharing
is one of the largest single domestic appropriations in
American history.
Special Revenue Sharing consolidates and replaces
existing federal categorical grants in specific program
areas. Two Special Revenue Sharing programs have been
enacted to date: Manpower Revenue Sharing which combines
a number of employment and training procrams, and Community
D.evelopment Revenue Sharing, which consolidates several
categorical grants previously administered by HUD. Dis-
cussions of Special Revenue Sharing in this paper will
focus on the latter program.
As the major federal domestic aid program of the Nixon
Administration, revenue sharing is part of an overriding
philosophy about the role of the federal government viz a viz
the States, called "The New Federalism". This philosophy
is based on a de-centralized view of federal authority and
a commitment to unencumbered funding of local jurisdictions.
The hands-off approach of the New Federalism represents a
departure from the guiding principle of categorical grants,
which held that substantial federal controls' were necessary
x
to make certain that local recipients conduct projects which
were in line with nationally determined ,priorities. Over
the course of the last four years revenue sharing has taken
the place of many of these programs. The magnitude of its
impact must be examined not only in terms of its own system
of appropriations, but also in terms of the loss of other
federal aid programs which have been forfeited in its favor.
This paper considers the various implications of General
Revenue Sharing and to some extent Special Revenue Sharing
for poor people and racial minorities. Though there is a
large degree of overlap between these two groups, they are
not assumed to be synonymous. The defining characteristic
of the poor is their economic.status, and the consequent
lack of political and social power which results from
that condition. Racial minorities are discussed more in
terms of socio-political characteristics; the set of
external limitations imposed upon them by a fundamentally
biased system. Both groups have been denied equal access
to societal resources, and both are numbered among those
most in need of the benefits of federal aid programs.
To state that "implications" of revenue sharing will
be discussed in this paper means that investigations will
be made of a series of relationships, i.e., the relation-
ship between implicit assumptions of the program, and the
expectations of its local clientele. Some determination
will be made as to how well General and Special Revenue
Sharing respond to the needs of the poor, and the relation-
xi
ship of those needs to the priorities of state and local
officials. The relationship of minority demands for access
to decision-making processes at the local level is another
dimension of this latter issue. Equally as important,
and the subject of the first two chapters of this paper, is
the relationship of program goals to program function, and
the effect which failure to meet those goals has on low-
income and minority people.
The first chapter and introduction of this thesis
traces the legislative history of General and Special
Revenue Sharing, highlighting the major components of the
enabling Acts, and the ways in which proponents of revenue
sharing thought that the program would address the fiscal
problems of state and local governments.
The second chapter examines the fiscal, administrative,
and legal implications of General Revenue Sharing. Discussion
of the allocation of.GRS money to eligible jurisdictions
focuses on the inequities inherent in the distribution
formula. Two important studies have been especially helpful
in evaluating the distribution of GRS funds. Work done
by the Stanford Research Institute in conjunction with' the
Technology Management Incorporated in Cambridge provides a
wealth of critical insights into the data upoin which the
formula is based. This study was commissioned by the Office
of Revenue Sharing which is responsible for administering
the GRS program and its findings represent probably the most
substantive critique of data insufficiencies published so far.
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A recently completed study of the Brookings Institution
in Washington is extremely valuable in considering GRS
in its entirety. I have found it especially useful in
documenting changes which should be made in the formula
itself in order for it to be more responsive to low-income
recipients. The Brookings Study is actually part of a
monitoring project begun in 1972 to analyze the effect of
GRS on recipient state and local governments. Field re-
searchers have reported regularly on the operations of GRS
in sixty-five jurisdictions, i.e., eight states, twenty-nine
municipalities, twenty-one countries, six townships, and one
Native-American tribe.
The second section of Ch'apter II focuses on the ex-
penditure patterns of GRS funds. The evidence thus far
indicates a decline of social program spending in favor of
tax relief and capital expenditures. By and large, local
government use of GRS money has not been targeted to low-
income people, and the simultaneous cutback in other
federal social programs has exacerbated the availability of
resources.
The legal implications of General Revenue Sharing with
regard to enforcement of anti-discrimination provisions is.
the topic examined in Chapter II. The inherent.weaknesses
in the GRS civil rights regulations, the laissez-faire
attitude of the Treasury Department in forcing compliance
with those regulations and the types of law suits which
have been brought by citizens who charge violation of their
xiii
rights, are considered in this section.
Two reports issued in February this year by the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights have provided excellent informa-
tion on the civil rights implications of revenue sharing.
Both include cogent suggestions to client groups and legis-
lators who wish to deal with the short-comings of the program.
The third chapter is devoted to the issue of citizen
participation, in both General and Special Revenue Sharing,
and the avenues for intervention in decision making avail-
able to people in urban communities. The chapter begins
by defining some of the general citizen participation issues
inherent in all federal aid programs. Next these issues
are placed in historical context by discussing the experience
of categorical grants: Urban Renewal, Community Action
Programs, and most recently, Model Cities.
Citizen participation in GRS is considered in light
of the lessons learned from grants-in-aid, and is also
examined as one area of concern in the overall municipal
budgeting process. Examples of strategies for obtaining
access into local GRS spending decisions, and the interaction
of those decisions with regular budgetary procedures, -have
been taken from a variety of sources. Foremost among them
is the first stage of a monitoring project recently completed
by the National Clearinghouse on Revenue Sharing, which
includes an interesting section on the obstacles to involve-
ment which local citizens have encountered.
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The final topic of this paper is Community Development
Revenue Sharing (CDRS) and the extent of participation by
minorities and the poor in the application for funds. The
Housing and Community Development Act which established
CDRS requires that eligible jurisdictions submit a three-
year community development plan which includes input from
local citizens, as a precondition to receiving CDRS money.
Research which I have done in Boston, Roxbury, and Newton
leads me to believe that this community development plan is
an important point of departure for indigeneous neighborhood
groups, and a major determinant of the degree to which
those neighborhood groups will be able to act as implementors
of the program once CDRS funds arrive.
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1I. THE PROGRAMS
A. Legislative History of General Revenue Sharing
One hundred and thirty-six years after the nation's first
revenue sharing bill was signed by Andrew Jackson, the State
and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-512) became
law.1 The General Revenue Sharing program (GRS) established by
the act became the backbone of former President Nixon's "New
Federalism", a program theoretically designed to meet domestic
public needs at the state and local level, to stabilize or
reduce state and local taxes, to decentralize government, and to
equalize fiscal conditions between rich and poor states and
localities.2 The experience of three years of GRS in operation,
however, provides substantial indication that this program has
been inadequate in serving the purposes for which it was designed,
and has in fact had a detrimental effect on those people least
able to weather adverse fiscal circumstances -- minorities and
the poor.
Under the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act, the Office
of Revenue Sharing is authorized by the Department of the
Treasury to return $30.2 billion to more than 38,000 units of
3
state and local government over a five year period. As of '
October 4, 1974, -15.82 billion dollars had been distributed
4
under the Act. Allocations to each governmental unit are
computed by two formulas, a three factor and a- five factor
formula', and appropriations are made equaling the higher amount
yielded by the two computations. The Senate three factor formula
2includes population, tax effort, and income. The House five
factor formula tabulates on the basis of population, urbanized
population, per capita income, State income tax collections and
general tax effort.5 One-third of the allocable amount for
each entitlement period goes to the State, and the remaining two-
thirds is apportioned to units of local government within the
state, i.e., county governments, municipalities, townships,
Indian tribes and Alaskan Native Villages.
Though funds received by units of local government must be
spent in certain priority areas, they are for all intents and
purposes bestowed by the Federal Government with few strings
attached. State governments may apply GRS funds to almost any
program or activity in which they would use their own funds.
8
Administrative provisions of the Act require state and local
governments to submit to the.Secretary reports on "planned"
and later "actual" use of revenue sharing funds received. Copies
of these reports must be published in newspapers of general
circulation. The non-discrimination provisions of the Act
prohibit exclusion from participation in, denial of benefits from,
or subjection to discrimination under any program funded with
revenue sharing money. 9 Chapter II of this paper discusses
in greater detail the shortcomings of these administrative
provisions. Lack of understanding of the reporting requirements,
and a record of local non-compliance with the civil rights
requirements, point to the inefficacy of both the administrative
language of the Act and enforcement procedure of 'the Office of
Revenue Sharing.
3Timed to coincide with the phasing out of the thirty-five
year legacy of specific categorical support, this "unencumbered"
funding approach is at the core of the New Federalism plan to
rejuvenate the power of state and local governments, by minimiz-
ing the federal role in local affairs, and by passing down some
of the federal revenue largesses. Urging support for the newly
proposed General Revenue Sharing Act, Nixon summed up this "hands
off" stance by the Federal government and empowerment of local-
ities,
The time has come for a new partnership between
the Federal Government and the States and
localities -- a partnership with a larger share
of the Nation's responsibilities, and in which
we share our Federal revenues wi i them so they
can meet those responsibilities.
Like Nixon, most proponents of General Revenue Sharing argue
that decentralization would encourage innovation and greater
responsiveness to the needs and interests of diverse segments
of the population. States and localities were judged better
equipped to recognize public priorities, because their con-
stiuencies were close at hand. However, the actual use of revenue
sharing funds over the past several years raises grave questions
about the validity of these assumptions. Protesting the lack of
input.into spending decisions, by minorities and the poor, Urban
League Executive Director Vernon Jordan summaXized.this mistrust
of local government as follows:
To black Americans who historically had no choice
but to look to the Federal Government to correct
the abuses of state and local governments ... (Rev-
enue Sharing) is ver much like hiring the wolf
to'guard the sheep.1
4Apparently this concern about the State governments'
ability to prioritize funds according to local interests is not
without historical precedent. As early as 1937, the Federal
Government found itself with a budget surplus and decided to
hand out over 37 million dollars to the twenty-six existing
states. For the next several years many of the recipient govern-
ments overextended their budgets, substituted surplus revenue
for local tax effort, and lavished funds on extravagant projects
of dubious social value. One example is the Georgetown and
Alexandria canal and acqueduct, built on the banks of the
Potomac. At the same time, budget makers in Illinois guided
by an illusion of Federal bounty continued to involve themselves
deeply in debt, satisfied that revenue sharing money would
relieve them of the burden of taxation.1 2
Though states have since become more adept at handling
their own funds, the conflict between federal and state govern-
ments in claiming sources of revenue remains. The issue of
taxation and stabilization of state and local taxes is one of
the main concerns which drafters of GRS legislation sought to
address. Responding to allegations from the States that the
Federal government has consistently left them with inadequate
tax resources, and recognizing the disparities in revenues
between rich and poor states, GRS proponents sought ways to
ameliorate histor'ical problems of taxation.
Up until the first World War, the federal tax system was
relatively simple. There was little conflict with the State
because the government used only those tax resources, such as
5customs, .which by law, the states were forbidden to tax. There
were other sources such as excises which the states had chosen
not to employ widely, and these also stayed within federal-
control. States relied on the property tax, a resource
protected from federal encroachment by the federal constitution.1
3
Gradually, as the federal government expanded its revenue
system, states grew dissatisfied with the property tax and
proceeded to develop additional sources of revenue. Eventually
as both levels of government broadened the categories of taxes
they employed, substantial overlap grew, as did federal and
state competition for lucrative tax sources. Federal, state,
and local governments found themselves fishing in the same tax
pond, with those at lower levsels blaming their financial troubles
on the avariciousness of higher governmental authority. Mayors
complained that the good taxes have been preempted by the states,
the states complained that they have been preempted by the
federal government; town and county government boards complained
that the property tax has been monopolized by the school districts,
etc.
The result of this competition and duplication of tax
sources, as well as other factors, is a relatively uncoordinated
fiscal system which is criticized as being regressive, and ill-
adapted to important economic ends such as full employment, 'and
15
maximization of national income. The uneven distribution of
economic resources throughout the country means that certain
areas have inadequate funds to meet their needs,'-so certain
basic services to which everyone is entitled. suffer. 1 6
I.
6At the local level, municipalities complain that mandatory
expenditures imposed on them by central units of government
exacerbate the latter's problem of inadequate resources.17 At
the root of what has been termed the "fiscal atrophy"- of cities
is the fact that expenditures exceed available revenue sources
18
and the city budget increases faster than the tax base. In-
adequacies and inefficiencies in local government structure
caused by duplication of facilities, and overlapping jurisdictions
which result from special districting, further complicate the
problem of raising and budgeting city revenues.
Older cities found frequently at the center of metropolitan
areas, are especially vulnerable to the problem of waning fiscal
viability. As the number of poor people in central cities in-
creases and the tax bases of such cities stagnate, many urban
areas find an absence of any correspondence between their stock
of taxable resources and their program needs.1 9
Citing these and -other aspects of the national fiscal
dilemma, former President Nixon posed revenue sharing as a much
needed panacea to lessen the burden of state and local taxes, to
enhance the accountability for local officials, and to provide
an alternative for what he termed the "highly restricted"
programs of categorical aid.20 Nixon discussed the "monopoly"
of the personal income tax by Washington, and the fact thatt
budget increases, at the Federal level could be financed readily
out of natural growth in revenues. In his view, revenue sharing
would alleviate this "fiscal mismatch", where-needs grew fastest
at one'level of government while revenues grew fastest at
7another, by applying fast growing Federal revenues to fast
21
growing State and local requirements. Furthermore, under
the revenue sharing program, State and local officials would
no longer be able to "pass- the buck" by blaming Federal
bureaucrats for misdirected spending. As a result, local
taxpayers would pressure those officials to become even more
mindful of their stewardship of public funds.22 Quoting
what the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
had called the "managerial apoplexy" resulting from paperwork
and confusing guidelines associated with federal grants-in-aid,
Nixon posed revenue sharing as an avenue of freedom, allow-
ing State and local governments to spend funds efficiently.2 3
Nixon's revenue sharing proposal was the result of a
series of plans, the most important of which had been
originated under a Democratic administration. During 1964,
the revenue sharing concept was popularized by Walter Heller,
then Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers.
Heller worked with Joseph Pechman, Director of Economic
Studies at the Brookings Institution, to structure the first
outline for what later was known as the Heller-Pechman plan.
Federal income taxes had been cut by 20% earlier that year,
because the Administration was fearful that a fiscal drag
would thwart continued economip growth. At that time, the
economy had experienced several years of uninterrupted
expansion, and economists worried that the strong revenue
response of the highly graduated federal income tax would
siphon 'tax dollars out of the income stream faster than the
government could spend them, thus constituting a drag on the
8economy.. It was believed that a tax cut would stimulate
economic activity, produce new revenue guickly, and compensate
for the reduction in taxes. As first proposed, revenue
sharing was advanced as a partial reduction to an additional
25future federal tax reduction.
These economists had also anticipated a "peace dividend"
or budget surplus which would result from the end of the
Vietnam war. Later, testifying in front of the House Ways
and Means Committee, Heller acknowledged that this dividend
never materialized, but continued to push for a revenue
sharing plan.26 The details of the 1964 Heller-Pechman
plan, as developed by the Presidential task force of which
they were a part contained five major features:
1. A percentage set aside. The federal
government would set aside a certain percent of
the federal individual income tax base for dis-
tribution to the states.
2. Automatic allocations of grant funds. The
funds allocated to the plan would be distributed
to the states without annual appropriations.
3. Unrestricted nature of the grants. There would
be no constraints on the use of funds by function,
with the exception of highway expenditures.
4. Distribution formula. The basic method of allo-
cating funds would be in proportion to population,
but per capita amounts would be multiplied by a
tax effort factor, to provide an incentive for
states and local governments to increase their
own fiscal effort, and also a small prop6rtion
of the total funds available, about 10% would be
allocated to the lowest income third of the states.
5. Pass-through to local governments. The original
plan had no mandatory pass-through to local govern-
ments. (This latter feature was changed in the Nixon
Administration proposal. A mandatory pass-through
I.
9of a portion of the grant funds to the local govern-
ment was included. 27
It should be noted that during the original Presidential
task force proceedings and later as continued revenue sharing
advocates, Heller and Pechman never suggested that categorical
grants be replaced by GRS.28 A year later Walter Heller
echoed these sentiments testifying before the House Ways
and Means Committee that "conditional grants play an indis-
pensable role in making federalism work."29 Both economists
felt that revenue sharing was essential as an additional
general support measure, to fill the gap between federal and
state-local revenues.
After the efforts of the 1964 task force were completed,
the Johnson Administration made no further public efforts
on behalf of revenue sharing, but the idea had become in-
creasingly popular in Congress.30 By the time that Nixon
announced the need for revenue sharing in 1968, state and
local officials had already commissioned a study which under-
scored the urgent need for new sources of revenue. The
research done by General Electric's Center for Advanced
Studies, under the sponsorship of the National League-of
Cities, warned that cities across the U.S. faced a $262 billion
revenue gap over a ten year period (1966 to 1975) which could
31force mayors to 'curtail vital services. Pressure for
revenue sharing mounted at the state and local level.
Both Nixon and Humphrey endorsed party platforms which
stressed the importance of revenue sharing, during the 1968
10
campaign. The next year Nixon appointed a task force headed
by Edward Banfield, a professor from Harvard, to come to a
consensus on the basic principles to be included in the
Federal revenue sharing plan. 3 2
During the 1970 congressional campaigns the "Big Seven"
a coalition of public interest group leaders 3 3 launched a drive
in support of revenue sharing which led to support for the
principle from more than 200 members of the House and 59
members of the Senate. Despite pressure from the Big Seven
and growing endorsement in Congress, no decisive action was
taken on revenue sharing until the 92nd Congress which
convened in 1972.34
By the time that hearing's began on revenue sharing
before the House Ways and Means Committee in 1972, a great
deal of interaction had occurred between mayors, legislators,
and the Administration. Two senators had come out with their
own versions of revenue sharing plans. Senator Muskie's
Intergovernmental Revenue Act, a bill introduced in May of
1971, would provide $6 billion in financial assistance to
state and local governments. This sum was greater than the
amount proposed by the Administration and it included 'larger
allocations for major cities.35 The Intergovernmental Fiscal
Coordination Act of 1971 (H.R.' 11950) introducedby.Wilbur
Mills, included three main provisions: (1) assistance to
local governments to help them meet certain types of high
priority demands, (2) payments to state governments designed
to provide an inducement to make appropriate use of individual
11
income taxes to meet their revenue needs, and (3) a voluntary
system of Federal collection of state income taxes.3 6 The
Mills plan was later amended with suggestions from the Big
Seven.
Hearings in the House Ways and Means Committee, and work
by Committee members resulted in several changes in the
allocation formula, an aspect of the revenue sharing idea
which was to undergo several more adaptations before it was
finally passed by the Senate. One of the most important
changes made while the bill was in this Committee was the
removal of the "maintenance of local effort provision",
which required 'localities to- spend revenue sharing funds
for increased services and not to reduce taxes. Without this
provision, the significance of spending categories was
reduced, because local governments could spend revenue sharing
funds for eligible programs which had previously been supported
by local funds, and tlen spend the "freed up" local funds
for any purpose.37 This defect remains in the final legisla-
tion, and as we will discuss more thoroughly in Chapter Iv,
has been the subject of much controversy.
Opposition to revenue sharing came from a number pf
cadres. The AFL-CIO offered continued resistance to the notion
of putting untied funds in the hands of state and local officials.
In a statement delivered by Andrew Bielmiller, Director of
the Department of Legislation, the AFL-CIO opposed general
revenue sharing for two basic reasons:
12
1. no strings money would not add federal
money to the funds available to the states
and localities, because it would substitute
for the full funding of existing programs.
2. there is no reason to believe that states,
cities, boroughs, townships, and school districts
are in a better position to weigh and balance
national priority needs and to use federal funds
to meet them more effectively.38
The Congressional Black Caucus opposed the revenue
sharing bill on the grounds that the distribution formula
was unfair, since it would allocate like amounts per capita
to rich suburbs and poor black communities. The Caucus also
pointed to the weakness of the non-discrimination feature of
the bill, and raised objections that the purposes for which
the funds could be spent did not correspond to the needs of
low-income minority communities, such as housing, health
39
care and education.
Though testifying in favor of the revenue sharing princ-
iple, Governor Sargent of Massachusetts also expressed doubts
before the Ways and Means Committee about the allocation
formula. He cited two examples of the formula's tendency
to stress local fiscal capacity, and overlook local needs.
Newton, Mass., one of Boston's most prosperous suburbs'
would receive a per capita allocation of $16.77 under the
Administration's proposal. New Bedford, a city of approxi-
mately the same size but which had a large low-income popula-
tion and a high number of people receiving public assistance,
would receive only $8.07 per capita. Sargent suggested that
"need" be taken into account, and that allocations to munici-
13
palities be adjusted by a local poverty factor, and a. local
population factor .
Despite such opposition, both the House and Senate passed
versions of the revenue sharing bill and a final Conference
Committee convened in order to resolve differences in the
two versions and to give the legislation i.ts final form.
The major differences between the two versions were the
allotments to the states. A compromise was reached which
allowed for computations to each state to be determined,
first under the House and then under the Senate formula, and
the allotment made would equal the higher amount. As it
turned out, this approach would cost more in the calendar
year 1972 than had been proposed by the Administration, so
41
each state's allocation was diminished by 8.5%. The
conference report was accepted by the House on October 12,
by a vote of 265 to 110; by the Senate on October 13, by a
vote of 59 to 19, and the State and Local Fiscal Assistance
Act was signed into law by the President on October 20, 1974.42
1974 Budget Cuts
The initially positive response to general revenue shar-.
ing by many state and local officials took an abrupt negative
turn in about January of the following year when the Admin-
istration releas'ed its fiscal 1974 budget. Deep cuts in
domestic social programs all but dissolved the New Federal-
ism coalition between federal and local officialb. Many
mayors felt that they had been misled by the Administration
14
when it described general revenue sharing as "new money" to
be added to existing subsidies.42
There is every indication that this "misunderstanding"
of the nature of revenue sharing funds was if not deliberate,
at least well founded. In his message to Congress on GRS,
delivered February 4, 1971 Nixon stated:
The specific appropriation level I am recommending
is 1.3% of taxable personal income; this would mean
a General Revenue Sharing program of approximately
$5 billion during the first year ....
All of this would be 'new money' -- taken from
the increases in our growing economy. It would
not require new taxes nor would it be transferred
from existing programs. 43
Nixon made similar statements in earlier speeches, both
in his State of the Union Message on January 22, 1971 and in
his January 29, 1971 Message to Congress on the fiscal year
budget.44
The logical conclusion to be drawn from the Administra-
tion's description of its fiscal proposals was that categor-
ical grants would be funded at then current levels until
special revenue sharing programs had been enacted. This
approach would guarantee general revenue sharing as an added
45
source of money for states and localities. However, it
soon became clear to disgruntled mayors across the country,
that the State ahd Local Fiscal Assistance Act was not
going-to provide "bonus funds". In its fiscal 1974 budget
documents, as well as in later statements, the A'dministration
suggested that state and local officials could use part of
15
their GRS allotments to make up for cuts in other programs.
According to the budget estimate ,the over-all levels of
grants-in-aid, including revenue sharing, would be nearly the
same in fiscal 1974 ($44.8 billion) as in fiscal 1973 ($45.-
billion) .46 Earlier a 1972 Treasury Department booklet
entitled "What General Revenue Sharing is All About", had
stated:
Revenue sharing does not mandate any cuts
in existing programs. The purpose of the
revenue sharing law is to allocate additional
funds to state and local governments to augment 47
existing programs and certain capital expenditures.
Local officials voiced their discontent at a June
conference in San Francisco. The mayors at East St. Louis
and Kansas City termed revenue sharing "a cruel hoax",
and Milwaukee's mayor labeled the programs "a gigantic double-
cross of the nation's poor." Richard Hatcher, the mayor of
predominately black Gary, Indiana, protested that federal
subsidies for his city would be cut from about $30 million to
$9 million per year; a loss which would mean, among other
things, 600 fewer new housing units, termination of a pro-
gram which provided meals for more than 3,000 low-income
senior citizens, and elimination of 5,000 Neighborhood Youth
Corps summer jobs, and curtailment of a family health center
48
that serves more than 550 needy families.
Under the assumption that GRS was new money, many of
the mayors present at the convention in San Fran'cisco said
that they had committed all of their 1972 allotments, before
16
announcement of the budget cuts. They had avoided spending
on social programs and resisted pressure from welfare,
housing, and other interest groups seeking funds for service
programs.49 Boston, for example, had planned to use most of
its revenue sharing funds to cover increases in uncontrollable
expenditures in order to avoid a tax increase. Pleas from
welfare mothers and other social service groups went unheeded.
Facing a net loss of $82 million in federal funds Mayor
White ofBoston labeled GRS a "shell game of enormous
proportions". White went on to explain that for every new
dollar received in GRS, five dollars in traditional federal
funds would be lost. His translation of the tangible conse-
quence of these losses echoed that of Mayor Hatcher. Five
thousand low and moderate housing units would not be built,
4,600 jobs in construction would not be provided, the Com-
munity Action Program run by Action for Boston Community
Development would die as of July 1 of that year, 5,000 jobs
for yputh would no longer be provided by a defunct Neighbor-
hood Youth Corps, and 80 city workers, hired from the ranks
of the unemployed and Vietnam Veterans would be fired (in
addition to the other 1,600 people the mayor had already
50
fired because of budget constraints). Meanwhile, Boston's
businesses and citizens would 'send $2.2 billign to Washington
in federal taxes, an increase of $200 million over the
. 51previous year.
Whether the reversal of the Administration's "new money"
promise was an intentional deception in order to get GRS through
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Congress, or whether it was an overstatement by federal
authorities which failed to take into account the effects of
inflation, the impact of the first year of revenue sharing
is clear. Those groups at the bottom of the economic ladder,
who are most affected by curtailed spending for housing,
employment, health and low-income services, were first to
feel the tightened reigns of the New Federalism. As we will
consider at length in succeeding chapters, the fiscal budget
cuts and reneged commitments of bonus federal funds, are
but one dimension of the adverse impact of GRS on minorities
and the poor.
B. Legislative History of Special Revenue Sharing:
CETA and HCDA
Once GRS was underway, the next major item on the
Administration's New Federalism agenda was Special Revenue
Sharing -- a program of block grants in broad functional areas.
In 1970, Nixon had proposed special revenue sharing for six
purposes:
1. manpower
2. law enforcement
3. education
4. transportation
5. urban community development
.6. rural community development
j
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According to his plan enactment of these proposals would
consolidate over 130 separate programs. ,The federal funding
would be free from matching requirements, maintenance of
effort restrictions, prior federal project approval require-
ments, and in Nixon's words "best of all, inflexible
federal plans. ,52
Until the Spring of 1974, only one of the six block
grants had passed. Congressmen, buttressed by interest groups
who benefit from categorical grants, had proved resistant to
special revenue sharing.53
The first of the ancillary SRS schemes to win Congres-
sional approval was the Comprehensive Employment and Train-
ing Act (CETA) signed into law on December 28, 1973. A
consolidation of various federal acts and programs previously
responsible for employment and training of unemployed and
underemployed person, CETA attempts a comprehensive reform
of national manpower l'egislation. The legislative history
indicates that CETA seeks "to provide a new and up-to-date
charter for the manpower programs which were previously
operated under the authority of the Manpower Development
Training Act, the Economic Opportunity Act, and the Entergency
Employment Act.54 Though many federal guidelines have been
removed from the consolidated program, the new legislation
does require that local governments submit their manpower
plans-to the Secretary of Labor for approval. The program
distributes funds on a formula basis, rather than the project
55
application approach of categorical legislation.
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Federal money under CETA is channeled directly to state
and local governments. All states, cities, and counties of
over 100,000 population will act as prime sponsors for the
manpower training programs. This shift of authority to local
general purpose governments is a break with the past categor-
ical grant tradition where the Department of Labor funded a
variety of organizations, such as Community Action Agencies,
56
unions and corporations, to implement manpower programs.
The other special revenue sharing bill,S. 3060,signed
into law in August, 1974 is the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act (HCDA). HCDA is a consolidation of a number of
grants-in-aid programs, but unlike CETA, HCDA incorporates
only programs administered bys the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, i.e., Model Cities, neighborhood develop-
ment, neighborhood facilities grants, open space, public
facilities loans, urban renewal, water and sewer grants.
The HCDA consolidation was accomplished by the Administra-
tion with the intent of providing the community with more
latitude in their development efforts than was possible
under the regulations of the superceded categorical grants.5 7
Under the HCDA program, funds would be. granted to- a
community development agency. Two year contracts would be
authorized subject to an application filed with the Secretary,
outlining community objectives over a four year period, and
describing proposed activities with estimated costs over a
two year period.58 A pre-requisite for assistande is that a
locality must outline its plan to (a) meet community housing
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needs, (b) prevent and eliminate slums and blight, and (c)
upgrade community services.59
The entire federal contract authority for HCDA is
$6.1 billion, $2.8 billion the first year, and $3.3 billion
the second. Funds are distributed to localities at the dis-
cretion of the Secretary, under a limitation that 75% of the
funds are for SMSA's and 25% for areas outside SMSA's. Ex-
cept for extreme hardship cases, funding would equal 90% of
net program cost, with cash required as the 10% local share. 61
Chapter III of this paper considers HCDA in greater detail,
in dealing with two case studies of citizen participation in
the application for HCDA funds. Citizen intervention in
the actual administration of SRS is difficult to document
at this early stage in the program's history, but as will
be discussed later, the degree of citizen participation in
the programs to be funded under either CETA or HCDA,
depends greatly on the' legacy of community input in superceded
categorical grants.
The passage of two special revenue sharing programs did
not entirely quell the debate over categorical vs. block
grant funding approaches. As mentioned previously, the phasing
out of categorical grants is actually not consistent with
the spirit of the original Heller/Pechman revenue sharing
proposals. Proponents of the block or unconditional grant
method, argue that it can be channeled directly to the root
of the fiscal dilemma and is therefore well siited to the
62Fbalancing of state and local deficiencies. Fiscal conserv-
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atives contend that governments closer to the people are
better able to determine local needs, and therefore should
be free to allocate without federal regulations.63
However, the evidence against total reliance on the block
grant approach is more convincing, especially in light of the
demands of low-income and minority communities. Categorical
grants recognize the national scale of most American problems,
and can better guarantee that crucial services will reach
those who are most in need.64 Though criticized for their
complicated delivery systems and red tape, categorical
grants have played an important role as bases of leverage in
community decision-making, and as providers of a degree of
community economic self-sufficiency.65
It is not clear that block grants are any less free of
administrative red tape once they reach the state level.
In fact, research by Professor Lawrence Susskind of M.I.T.
has revealed the reverse to be true. In tracing the
administration and expenditures of two block grants in Massachu-
setts, the Partnership for Health and the LEAA's Safe Streets
and Law Enforcement Assistance Program, Susskind found that
unrestricted grants merely recentralize decision-making power
at the local level, creating a new layer of what he calls,
"administrative fat" between elected "policy jpakers and the
neediest of client groups whose survival to a large extent
depends on public services."66
Decentralists have supported revenue sharing because un-J
tied funds limit federal interference into matters which
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were perceived to be of local concern. Fiscal conservatives
looked to revenue sharing to ease the financial strains of
state and local governments, and to correct the traditional
Federal pre-emption of the most productive sources of tax
67
revenue. Mayors initially backed GRS not only because of
hopes of new federal money, but also because GRS funds flowed
through city hall rather than directly to semi-autonomous
local agencies responsible to the Federal Government. This
latter attraction is the essence of what the Nixon adminis-
tration meant by "local control":
Instead of focusing these (GRS) decisions
in Washington, my administration has begun to
develop power-to-the-people programs under
which local officials -- who know the local
scene best -- are given funds and the freedom
to allocate those funds as local conditions
suggest, with a minimum of federal red tape
and regulations.68 (emphasis added)
In contrasting Nixon's generalist New Federalism to the
Kennedy-Johnson policy of focusing aid on the area of great-
est ne-ed, one writer has aptly observed that when the former
President called for "power-to-the-people" he was talking
69about a totally different set of individuals. Indeed,
when the slogans of the Black Pantherand the Republican parties
become synonymous, observers have cause to wonder.
Planned Variations
Two of the precursors to special revenue sharing in the
field of community development are programs khown as Planned
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Variations, and Annual Arrangements. .After three years of
operation, both offer unique insights into what happens when
elected officials of local general purpose governments are
given almost total discretion over federal funds. 7 0
Twenty city governments from among 147 participating
in the HUD Model Cities Program were chosen for the New
Federalism experiment -- Planned Variations. The local
Model Cities agencies which had been cornerstones of LBJ's
program, were virtually eliminated. Instead the authority
of the elected city officials was expanded to include three
new. powers: First, the ability to spend Model Cities sub-
sidies city wide, and not just in the model neighborhood;
second, the power to obtain waivers of administratively
imposed regulations in any federal progtam which operates in
conjunction with a model cities plan; third, and perhaps
most important is the authority delegated to the chief
officer, known as CERC,. CERC or Chief Executive Review and
Comment allows the mayor to veto or force changes in any
federal programs which he thinks impact his city.7 1
The outcome of the Planned Variations experiment has
proved to be directly linked to the strength of the mayor's
office. In Houston and Indianapolis where the mayors are
already politically powerful, agencies have been forced to
change strategies and follow dictates handed down from city
hall. The mayors have used their additional money and power
to develop management structures within their own offices. 7 2
Conversely, in cities such as San Jose Where operating
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agencies expert at federal grantsmanship have always been
stronger than either the mayor or city k;all, the power of CERC
has been ignored, and from the administration's point of view,
Planned Variations has been unsuccessful.73
Another factor which has vitiated the efficiency of
Planned Variations is the political rivalry between mayors,
city officials and governors in the various projects. In
states such as California where county governments are
exceptionally strong, those rivalries have been most
intense. The regional cooperation and ability to coordinate
efforts, which Nixon apparently assumed to exist at the state
and local level, proved insufficient.74
The second of the New Federalism experiments, Annual
Arrangements, was HUD's attempt to bolster local control by
consolidating Urban Renewal, Model Cities, Sewer and Open
Space, Neighborhood Facilities, and Rehabilitation Loans into
a single $2.3 billion'program. Monies were allocated via a
formula to mayors who have total discretion over individual
project funding. Annual Arrangements was a way of making
HUD programs in 79 cities function in a manner similar to
the recently enacted HCDA.
Annual Arrangements proved unsuccessful and relatively
inefficient. One reason for the failure was the inability '
of HUD to shift 'money among categorical grant programs. Another
crucial reason was the fact that the funding of Annual Arrange-
ments was held to an insufficient level. 7 5
The shift from federal to local control in these and other
1.
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New Federalism experiments offered a number of important conclu-
sions and policy implications for general and special revenue
sharing. One conclusion is that the efficiencies sought by the
Nixon administration could not be achieved in places where
mayors and governors had minimal control over administra-
tive bodies in their jurisdictions capable of receiving
grants-in-aid. Nixon's plans proved troublesome in cities with
strong independent agencies and weak city halls. These
projects also make clear that the New Federalism does nothing
necessarily to foster cooperation between state, county, and
local governments, and if anything that rivalry is aggravated
by competition for new powers and funds.7 6
HUD's own evaluations of Annual Arrangements stated that
citizen participation in the development and negotiation of
plans were minimal. Many citizen components in both programs
were reduced from policy-making to merely advisory bodies.
Representatives of community groups were appointed rather
than elected. The overall impact of community input was
diminished by the switch from neighborhood to city wide
77
bases of power.
Not only does the New Federalism's redistribution of power
and money aggravate deficiencies in municipal management,
and intergovernmental coordination, the absende 6f explicit
federal guidelines under revenue sharing renders the principles
of participatory democracy, expendible.
I.
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II. The Implications of GRS for Minorities and the Poor
A. The Distribution Formula.
The distribution formula by which general revenue
sharing funds are allocated to states and local units of
government has a very definite effect on the impact of those
funds on poor and/or minority communities. There are a
number of major flaws inherent in the formula itself, and in
its data base which result in the perpetuation of historic
inequities between rich and poor communities, and in the short-
changing of large urban centers with a high proportion of
low-income minority residents. Some of these flaws were
forseen by Congressional opponents to GRS. Others have be-
come apparent only after the program began to function.
As stipulated in the State and Local Fiscal Assistance
Act, allocations are made to States on the basis of either
the Senate or the House distribution formula. One-third
of the designated amount is retained by the state, and the
remaining two-thirds are divided among units of local govern-
ment. The Senate formula gives equal weight to three
factors, (1) population, (2) general tax effort, and (3)
relative income. Population data come from Census figpres.
General tax effort is derived by dividing the total state
and local tax revenue, by the personal income of the state's'
residents. The relative income factor comes from the
division of nationwide average per capita income by the
state's per capita income. The shared revenue for each
state is determined by multiplying these three factors, and
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then dividing the sum of the corresponding products for all
51 states. 2
The House formula uses five components: (l) population,
(2) population multiplied by relative income, (3) urbanized
population, (4) general tax effort, and (5) fifteen per
cent of the revenue from state-imposed personal income; but
not less than 1% or greater than 6% of the federal personal
3income tax of its residents. With the House formula the
state's entitlement consists of the sum of the state's
4proportion of the national total. Under the terms of the
aforementioned Senate House compromise, the higher of the
two amounts derived from these formulas is awarded to each
state.
Within states, the 1/3, 2/3 division holds except if
later allocation steps result in any local government re-
ceiving more than 50% of the sum of its non-school tax
revenue and its receipts from intergovernmental transfers,
during that fiscal year. In cases such as these the excess
reverts to the state government.5
The distribution formula among county areas is much like
the three factor state allocation procedure, with the
additional feature of a maximum-minimum per capita entitle-
ment. The per capita amount distributed to any county area#
or any unit of local government within a sta te may not be
less than 20 per cent or more than 145 per cent of two-
thirds of the amount allocated to the State divided by the
population of that State.6 Adjusted amounts made in order to
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bring allocations within range are spread proportionately
7
among the remaining county areas.
Within county areas, funds are apportioned in several
stages. An Indian tribe or an Alaskan native village re-
ceives an award equal to its proportion of the total county
population. The remainder is divided between the county-
government, the township governments, and municipal govern-
ments according to the respective amounts of non-school tax
8
revenue raised by each. The individual township and municipal
totals are determined by a formula which gives equal weight
to population, relative income, and relative tax effort.9
If the entitlement for any unit of local government below
the level of county government is less than $200, or if the
governing body waives the entitlement, the award is added
to the county area entitlement.10
Adjusted decreases of township or municipal allocations
resulting from the 50% limitation give rise to a correspond-
ing increase in the county government's share, whereas any
curtailment in the county area's award results in an
increase in the state government's allocation.11
The task of distributing revenues to thousands of- local
governments is extremely complex, given the diverse fiscal
and organizational patterns of American federalism. There
are over 38,000 general purpose governments eligible to
receive revenue sharing funds,12 and a great deal of variety
exists in the way these jurisdictions are struct'ured, inter-
related, and in the degree to which each delegates responsibility
36
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to political subdivisions. Local government operations can
be performed by counties, townships, and municipalities.
Depending on the state, county governments may be weak or
strong, townships may be active or literally non-existent,
and the role of municipalities varies greatly with the extent
of urbanization.14
Critique
The complexity of the myriad local jurisdictional
structures would lead to the assumption that the creation of
an effective distribution formula would be an ambitious
quantitative undertaking, based on mathematical and economic
calculations. Though many of, the early calculations were
made with technical assistance and computer capacity provided
by the Treasury Department, it seems that adoption of a final
allocation formula was more a result of political bargaining
than mathematicaldeduction. Explaining how the formula for
GRS came about, James C. Corman, Democrat California
member of the Ways and Means Committee reported:
We finally quit, not because we hit on a
rational formula, but because we were.exhausted
and finally we got one that almost none of could
understand at the moment ...
.. . We were told that statistics were not available
to run the [computer] pri-nt on it, so we adopted
it, and here it is for you today. 15
Subsequent surveys and research studies have made clear
the shortcomings of this political decision-makihg process.
Investigation of the data base as well as certain legisla-
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tive provisions highlight the basic weaknesses of the distribu-
tion formula.
Three main indicators are used to compute revenue shar-
ing awards: (1) population, which is the major indicator of
size; (2) per capita income, which is the basic indicator
of need; and (3) adjusted taxes, which is the principle
indicator of effort to satisfy need.1 6 A study of the dis-
tribution formula done by the Stanford Research Institute (SRI)
found that of these three, the population and per capita
income data had many more problems than the tax data, that
this finding was true at the state, county, and local levels.1 7
The lack of currency, and accuracy revealed in the demographic
and economic data stems from the fact that before 1972, all these
figures had been collected for other purposes, such as
general statistical information and national accounts. No
federal or state statistical agency, including the Bureau
of the Census and the Bureau of Economic Analysis has ever
gathered demographic, economic, or taxation data to be used
in an "interactive, competitive formula that allocates
18
public funds to a large number of recipients." Furthermore,
the Bureau of the Census had never published, intended to
publish and did not intend to use except in aggregates the
income data for units of government whose population numbered
less than 2,500 people.
Lack of currency proved to be the major flaw in state
t.
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level data, studies by SRI. Though revised personal income figures
are available for 1973, these were not used by the Office of
Revenue Sharing. Instead the 1971 personal income series
was used in order to conform with fiscal year 71-72 state and
local tax information used to compute general tax effort.
Money income data was based on reported 1969 incomes. SRI
found that state and local tax data was being used up to
36 months after taxes were collected. Even older informa-
tion has been used for state urbanized population, a data
element that is computed once in a decade.2 0
Accuracy appeared to be the essential problem with
county areas and local area data. At this level, the money
income component was found to be the least reliable. The
suspect nature of the money income data is doubly grave,
because it is used twice at the county level, once to figure
per capita income, and Again to determine aggregate money
income. 21
SRI concluded that errors in timeliness cause greater
inequities than errors in accuracy, and that correcting for
the latter without righting the former may well increase
inequity at current levels. The study recommended a number
of alternative data sources which could be used in the
allocation formula, and concluded that the only general remedy
under the current act is to increase the frequency of collection
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for data elements; per capita income, urbanized population,
and substate population especially.22
Though the SRI analysis delineated a number of weaknesses
in the data base used for the revenue sharing formula, by
far the widest national attention has been focused on the
Census undercount, particularly as it relates to minorities
and the poor. The Bureau of the Census has estimated that
5.3 million Americans were not counted by the 1970 census.23
Of that group, at least 1.87 million black people, about 7.7%
24
of the black population were not counted. It is possible
that the undercount for Spanish-speaking people is as high
as that for blacks. Cities such as New York, Los Angeles,
San Antonio, and El Paso with large Spanish-speaking
populations are especially shortchanged by the undercount.25
Predominately black cities such as Washington, D.C. are in
a similar situation.
Research done by the Urban League Data Service estimates
that New York City "lost" $6.7 million in GRS funds due to
the census undercount. Chicago "lost" $2.5. million, the
District of Columbia, $1.5 million, and Houston and St. Louis
about 1/2 million dollars each.26 In 1972, Boston's ABCD
surveyed its Spanish-speaking population and found discrepan-
cies with census figures. The local study showed that 48.8%
of Spanish-speaking households in the city were receiving
27
welfare. The Census Bureau had reported 30.8%. , Though
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evidence such as this would support Boston's claims for
additional funds, to date the city's arguments for more
GRS money have been based on the property tax burden and
28
not population factots.
The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act authorizes
the Secretary of the Treasury, and thus ORS, to use alternative
sources "when the data ... are not current enough, or
are not comprehensive enough to provide for equitable alloca-
tions. ,29 If so determined, he may "use such additional
data, including data based on estimates, as may be provided
for in regulations."30 Thus far, the Treasury Department
has declined to take action under the contention that even
if a way to arrive at correct estimates-did exist, the
population figures do not heavily influence the actual alloca-
.31
tion.
Several citizens,groups have organized around the under-
count problem as a basis to contest revenue sharing allotments.
In Newark, New Jersey, for example, public interest groups
and the city of Newark petitioned the Office of Revenue Shar-
ing for corrections in the population data used to compute
32
that city's entitlement. This coalition alleged that a
minority undercount of 7.7% resulted in a loss to the city of
$425,000 in funds. The following year, in April of 1974,
Newark filed suit against the Treasury Department'-to adjust
its population data in order to compensate for census in-
c. 33
accuracies.
t.
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Two cities in Massachusetts have staged similar official
protests, on the basis of underenumeration. Selectment in
Chelmsford filed an appeal with the Secretary of the Treas-
ury challenging what they thought was too small a slice of
general revenue sharing funds.. They complained that their
allotment was less than one half the share of two neighbor-
ing towns, both of which were the same size or smaller.3 4
Lowell, Mass. succeeded in getting an additional $600,000
from the Federal government after protesting that the census
had credited the town with 10,000 less than its actual
population. The city took its own count and went to
Suffolk Superior Court to negotiate for the right to have
the higher population figure used, not only for calculating
its share .of GRS funds passed down through the state, but
also for determining state aid and for apportioning local
representatives.
Formula Regulations: 145% Ceiling, 20% Floor
While many of the inequities in the allocation of revenue
sharing monies can be traced to the data base., there are
also aspects of the distribution formula which are responsible
for imbalanced awards. The maximum-minimum per capita
provision is one such aspect. The regulation,,that no
jurisdiction may receive per capita more than 145% of the
state's per capita revenue sharing entitlement works against
poorer areas. If there were no ceiling, many of these low-
I.
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income communities would receive more money, because their
lower per capita income figures would yield higher allot-
ments.36 The estimated effect of this ceiling by fiscal
1975 is a reduction of the amount of shared revenue that
will be received in 1.9% of all townships, and 3.6% of all
37-
other local jurisdictions.
The 20% floor provision is most often applied in town-
ship areas. The stipulation that no jurisdiction will
receive per capita less.than 20% of the state's average per
capita amount means that larger amounts go to smaller juris-
dictions, where service needs may be less pressing and where
38
government operations tend to be less extensive. The
Brookings study found that for 1972, this provision benefited
nearly 9,0-00 units; about one-third of all townships and one-
sixth of all municipalities.39
Indiana and Ohio provide the most clear example of the
effect of the 20% floor. Ninety-one per cent of Indiana's
townships had their 1972 entitlements increased by this
provision. Nearly two-thirds of Ohio's townships benefited
from the 20% floor, in most cases having their entitlements
raised all the way to that level. Nationwide, over 41% of
this country's 16,915 townships and about 18.6% of all other
local areas will receive additional funds in.-fisaal 1975
because of the lower limit. Without the 20% minimum, these
payments would be going to larger more active governmental
units, and there would be a reduction in the,tendency of the
li
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A third shortcoming of the revenue sharing formula is
that it treats all governments alike eventhough they do not
perform the same functions, and do not have the same level of
available financial resources to finance their activities.
Functions such as the provision of social services vary from
state to state, and are in some instances,,provided by
municipalities, sometimes by county governments, and in other
cases, by the state itself.4 2
The formula supposedly takes account of varying functions,
via the tax effort factor, under the assumption that juris-
dictions that perform more functions collect more revenues.43
However, there are several fallacies in this assumption.
The tax effort factor is not keyed directly to levels of
government service, so it is possible for money to be
targeted to inefficient governments because of their
relatively high tax rates. Also, the formula does not
take into account certain kinds of non-tax revenue, such as
school tax revenue and this exclusion skews the law's
measurement of relative fiscal effort at both the state and
45local levels.
Inadequate distinctions are made between the differing
availability of resources to governments. The formula
uses income to judge the relative financing capacity of
state and local governments. Yet, this basis would only be
accurate if, aside from intergovernmental aid, governments had
no means for financing their activity, except for personal
46income taxation. Personal income taxes supply only
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about one-fifth of general revenue of'-local governments.
Sales, and property taxes are much larger contributors to
local revenue. 47 Revenue sharing entitlements are consequent-
ly determined without differentiating between governments
with adequate resources or even substantial budget surpluses,
and those which are suffering serious fiscal setbacks.4 8
Authors of the Brookings study concluded that the
formula would .be improved if it did not rely on per capita
income as a proxy indicator of relative fiscal capacity,
but instead adopted the following alternatives:
1. For state-by-state allocations, use a set of
annually updated estimates of the total taxing or
revenue-raising potential of the respective state
areas.
2. For allocations to individual municipalities
and townships within each county, used state cer-
tified data on equalized property values.
3. For the allocation of statewide local amounts
among county areas, used either corresponding
property values o'r other more comprehensive
measures of local capacity.49
Suggested Revisions
Some of the revisions suggested by critics of the dis-
tribution formula would require long term, relatively
comprehensive measures. Others can be accomplished legis-
latively, by revisions in the law.
Correction of inaccuracies and lack of currency in the
census data is probably the most complex task. The Stan-
ford Research Institute advocates redesigning the 1980
census, if revenue sharing is to continue in its present form.5 0
I.
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This redesign assumes continued efforts to reduce income
misreporting, bias, and underrenumeration. The SRI investi-
gators also felt that the Bureau of the Census should
authorize sufficient funding so that sampling, questionnaires,
aggregation, and other purposes can be designed to accomodate
the needs of revenue sharing as well as general statistical
needs. The reformed census should include anticipation
of more frequent updating of the figures through mid-
decade censuses and intercensal estimates. 51
Though the SRI does report that no feasible short-
range solutions were found for adjusting the underenumera-
tion below the state level, an appendix to the study makes
a definite statement with regard to the equity of allocations:
Ignoring the problem of underenumeration, or
treating it as irresolvable because there is
no strict solution to distribution of the uncounted
population, means that governments whose populations
are counted less yell than others may not receive
their equitable ,shares. 52
With regard to formula provisions in the revenue
sharing law, the Brookings Institute report recommends, among
other things, removal of both the 145% ceiling and the 20%
floor. Elimination of the per capita ceiling would benefit
the most hard-pressed local jurisdictions, would reduce the
law's bias in favor of multi-layered local government,
would simplify its administration and make the resulting
allocations far more understandable to officials and the
53public.
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Removal of the 20% per capita floor of individual town-
ships and municipalities reduces the bias against consequen-
tial local governments, and would correct the law's strong
tendency to shore up marginal jurisdictions.
t.
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B. Fiscal Impact
In order to understand the implications of revenue
sharing expenditures, especially at the local level, it is
useful to examine the financial context into which the program
has been introduced: the fiscal plight of American cities.
As the legislative history indicates, general revenue sharing
was offered as a panacea to the financial gap between local-
ities and the federal government which many assume to be the
root of this fiscal crisis. As will be discussed in a later
section,once delivered to localities, the effectiveness of
revenue sharing expenditures depends greatly on the efficiency
of municipal budget management. However, at this point in
time it is quite evident that the overall funding of the
general revenue sharing program does not even approximate
the actual level of funding necessary to ameliorate the munici-
pal financial dilemma., Furthermore, the inadequacies and
inefficiencies in local government structure caused by
duplication of facilities, and overlapping jurisdictions
which result from special districting, exacerbate the
problem of raising and budgeting city revenues. General
revenue sharing includes no incentives and even fewer
guidelines for addressing these issues.
Cities usually have control over a number of varied
taxes which comprise their total revenue package. "Property,
income or wage taxes, cigarette and liquor taxes, general
sales, utility, entertainment admissions, license and hotel
48
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occupancy taxes are all part of the local tax revenue.
In addition, user charges, such as those for refuse
collection, use of public facilities and other miscellaneous
services, provide an increasingly high proportion of local
55government revenues. Intergovernmental revenue is made
up of shared taxes, grants, loans, and all funds received from
56
another unit of government for performance of specific functions.
A look at municipal expenditures reveals that the
majority of total general financial outlays have traditionally
been for municipal services, education, police, protection,
highways, and public welfare. Local governments also spend
money on fire protection, hospitals, sewage, parks and
recreation, and housing and urban renewal.
By far the most decisive factor in the imbalance between
local expenditures and revenues, is inflation. Especially
in recent years, higher prices have had the greatest effect
on basic urban services. Between 1965 and 1970, prices paid
for goods and services by state and local governments rose
at an average annual rate of 5.8%, as compared to 5.0% for
the Federal Government and 4.0% for the country at large.57
In the decade from 1958 to 1968, expenditures for all of
these services, except hospitals and highways, doubled. Those
for welfare more than quadrupled. Spending for police
protect on expanded by 140%, and education 150%.58
T e effects of shrinking budgets and growing expenditures
are a big part of the urban fiscal crisis. In response to
this squeeze, many cities have curtailed their level of
49
services, reduced support for public welfare and have fore-
stalled capital improvements and new coistruction. Cities
like Oakland, California have exhausted the property tax,
and have succeeded in circumscribing their own capacity to
raise new revenues.59 Wage increases and the assumption of
services such as gas and electric power, formerly provided
by the private sector, further aggravate the problem.60
Economic.and legal restrictions limit the city's
ability to raise and to use money. Usually, legislative
permission must be granted before a municipal tax or charge
can be implemented. Restrictions on public debt, legal
rate ceilings and other tax rate limitations are set by law
61
and are not easily changed.
In light of all these economic and legal constraints,
the major revenue producer which can be fully administered
and controlled by city government is the property tax. It
has served as almost the sole source of support for school
districts, and in 1970 provided about 70% of municipalities
total taxes. The fact that shelter is essential makes it
the most pervasive of all taxes, and its potentially re-
gressive nature, inequities in rates and valuation, have
been the subject of much controversy.
Originally, the rationale,-for the tax on property was
that municipal services rendered to citizens, such as police
and fire protection, benefitted property owners and enhanced
the value of their possessions. Yet today, growing numbers
t.
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of daytime non-resident workers commute to the CBD, use
municipal services, but pay taxes in the suburbs, and many
lower income renters need municipal services which do not
enhance the value of property.62 An individual's property
holding, or lack of it, is no longer a clear measure of his
wealth, and is not an accurate indication of his need for
public services and tax-paying capability. 6 3
Overreliance, or exhaustion of the property tax further
handicaps local governments because of its unresponsiveness
to increases in income. In cities such as Oakland, where the
differential reliance on the property tax ranges from 44 to 47%,
the demands made upon local government as a result of growing
populations and escalating services, cannot be met by a
tax whose yield is inelastic. 6 4
In 1971 the Master Tax Plan Commission for the state
of Massachusetts reported that property owners carry 56%
of the total state and local tax load, the highest of all
the states. In Boston that figure was 70%, in a city where
20% of the people were reported to be on welfare, and 20%
were bankrupt. Even then the tax increase on real estate
was estimated to be $30 per capita for the following year.
This situation was cited by former Mayor John Collins in
his testimony in support of Revenue Sharing duripg the first
set of hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee.
A much needed reform of tax practices would encompass
four main public policy objectives. Increased productivity
would mean that each government unit would be able to support
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itself. Greater elasticity would foster revenue responsive-
ness to changing economic conditions. True progression would
ensure fair distribution of the tax load among taxpayers, and
lessen the burden on low income families who pay an in-
ordinate proportion of their earnings for housing. Another
important objective of tax reform is to make the process of
collection more efficient and economical for both the tax-
payer and the government.6 5
Expenditure of Funds
When asked about the limitations on the use of revenue
sharing funds and what would prevent a city from substitut-
ing shared revenues for its formal financing of services,
like the police force, and then using the money to cut
taxes, former Presidential Advisor, on Domestic Affairs
John Erlichman answered:
Nothing. That is fine. If that is the highest
priority in that community to get real estate
taxes down, and if the council politically can
make that fly, that is up to them. 66
Given the rising tax rates which are part of the local
fiscal crisis, it is not hard to understand the motivation
for state and local governments who want to make tax
reductions "fly". Nor is the use of revenue-shakfing funds
to reduce taxes completely ccontrary to the interests of
low-income people. Though it is true that most poor people
do not own their own homes, they are subject, to the vagaries
1.
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of the property tax since they must pay rent increases to
finance their landlord's rising tax rates. A community guide
to revenue sharing, put out by the movement for Economic
Justice suggests that property rax relief joined with rent
control-legislation, or legislation forcing landlords to
pass the tax relief savings on to their tenants, would be a
beneficial use of GRS funds. This same guide suggests that
comprehensive tax reform is the real issue facing low-
income people who need fiscal relief.
Thus far, in the GRS program, the major fund expendi-
tures have gone toward to tax reduction, the prevention of
tax increases or new taxes, and to holding down the rates of
tax increases. During the first entitlement period over
half (50.8%) of local governments devoted general sharing
67funds to tax relief. Later, in 1973, the State of
Massachusetts announced that it would use $82 million of
its revenue sharing funds to prevent an increase in taxes.
This use of revenue sharing monies obviated the need for an
emergency 10% increase in state income taxes, retroactive
to January 1, 1972.68
Not all local governments favored tax reductions.as a
use of funds. Usually the reason cited for the decision not
to cut taxes is the tax effort-factor in the formula. Tax
cuts financed out of shared revenue diminish a jurisdiction's
entitlement in the future.69
A survey of the nature of revenue sharing expenditures
to date reveals substitution of revenue sharing monies for
I.
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funds that would normally come out of state and local- budgets
is the major category of funds uses. New and innovative
spending rank much lower on the hierachy of expenditure
priorities. A report done by Caputo and Cole for ORS found
that most entitlements were spent on existing rather than
new services, and that money that was used-, was spent in
relatively few categories.70
In the Northeast, especially, revenue sharing money
went to operating and maintenance rather than capital
expenditures. This tendency became more apparent nation-
wide during the second entitlement period, (July 1, 1972 to
December 31, 1972). Cities stressed public safety, public
transportation, and environmental protection.7 2 Figures
for Massachusetts cities seem to bear out this trend. In
the Boston area, both Weymouth and Medford allocated sub-
stantial proportions of their entitlements to police depart-
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ment salaries. Framingham, Braintree, and Quincy favored
fire department salaries, and equipment expenses. Melrose
devoted most of its revenue sharing allotment to regular
operating expenditures, and Nahant earmarked substantial
amounts for garbage and trash removal. 4 Farther north,
across the state border, Burlington, Vermont designated its
revenue sharing money to the provision of new..municipal band
75
uniforms; testimony to the fact that smaller locales with-
out a history of incoming federal money, welcome revenue
sharing as a minibonanza.
TABLE I - Expenditure by Function for States, Counties, Townships,
and Cities - 1966-67
STATES COUNTIES TOWNSHIPS CITIES
Amount Percent of Amount Percent of Amount Percent of Amount Percent- of
in Total State in Total County in Total Township in Total City
millions Expenditures millions Expenditures millions Expenditures millions Expenditures
Education $9,384 27.4 $1,893 16.0 $709 33.2 $3,140 16.5
Higher education 7,728 22.6 115 1.0 --- --- 
245 1.3 -
Local Schools 300 0.9 1,778 15.0 709 33.2 2,855 15.0
Other 1,357 4.0 --- --- --- 40 0.2
Transportation 9,609 28.1 2,012 17.0 500 23.4 2,393 12.6
Highways 9,423 27.5 1,916 16.2 496 23.3 2,131 11.2
Air and Water Transporta-
tion 186 0.5 96 0.8 4 0.2 262 1.4
Public Welfare 4,291 12.5 2,606 22.0 95 4.5 1,226 6.5
Cash Assistance 2,297 6.7 1,567 13.3 38 1.8 745 3.9
Other Public Welfare 1,994 5.8 1,038 8.8 57 2.7 482 2.5
Hospitals 2,857 8.3 1,180 10.0 10 0.5 1,028 5.4
Realth 501 1.5 295 2.5 13 0.6 255 1.3
Police Protection and
Corrections 1,188 3.5 726 6.1 117 5.5 2,158 11.4
Local Fire Protection --- 61 0.5 75 3.5 1,300 6.8
Scrae and Sanitation ------ 148 1.3 150 7.0 1,874 9.9
L-cal Farks and Recreation --- --- 200 1.7 61 2.9 905 4.8
Nat:ral Resources 1,801 5.3 274 2.3 --- --- ---
- ousing and Urban Renewal 28 0.1 --- --- 5 0.2 808 4.3
tibrarica 49 0.1 98 0.8 30 1.4 302 1.6
Employ-ent 545 1.6 --- --- --- --- 2 **
Financial Administration 743 2.1 350 3.0 53 2.5 331 1.7
Other 3,263 9.5 1,976 1..7 1 14.8 37273 _7.2
- $4 0 100.0 $11,819 99.9*** 1$2,133 100.0 $18,995 100.0 a
* Welfare expenditures are comprised largely of direct payents (cash assistance) to the poor, aged, and disabled. According to the Office of
Revenue Sharing, direct welfare payments cannot be financed with Fcderal shared revenues. Nevertheless, there are a variety of cocial
service support programs for welfare recipients and other low income people that do qualify for revenue sharing.
** Less than 0.05%.
*** Percentages do not add to 100.0 due to rounding.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1967 Census of Governments, Compendium of Government Finances.
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Most of the funds not devoted to tax stabilization in
initial entitlement periods went to one-etime, non-recurring
expenditures such as capital improvements, and replacement
76
of heavy equipment. Though there has been a trend away
from one-time projects in subsequent entitlement phases, it
is still clear that social service spending ranks low on
the list of municipal budget priorities even with the ad-
dition of GRS funds. Some attribute this lack of social
program spending to uncertainty about the length .of the
national revenue sharing program. Many states and localities
are reluctant to start support for new social projects for
fear of being left holding the bag if federal funding
runs out. Eighty per cent of' all program funds have gone
77
to support existing rather than new projects.
Nationally, about 4% of.state revenue sharing funds
have been set aside for social services for the poor and
aging, 1% for housing, and 4/10% for economic development. 78
The City of Cambridge which used its $4.5 million allotment
of supplement the regular city budget, designated over $1/2
million to public works. In that category,' more than $23,000
went to the tree committee, gypsy moth control, and treat-
ment of dutch elm disease -- an amount which exceeds by
$10,000 the combined allocation for senior citizens and the
mentally retarded.
An interesting, though unfortunately exceptional con-
trast to this lack of social service spending, i' the town of
Baxter Estates, Long Island. In this small affluent village,
trustees voted to give $1,000 or 20% of their revenue
56
Table II Percentage of Revenue Sharing Recipients Providing
Tax Relief or Minimizing Debt Increases
Unit of Government
States
Counties
Townships
Cities
Indian Tribes and
Alaskan Native
Villages
Total
Tax Relief
30.2%
57.7
43.5
W 43.6
0.7
44.7%
Minimizing Debt Increases
15.7%
39.1
35.5
27.9
19.4
32.6%
J"
Source:i Office of Revenue Sharing, General Revenue Sharing - The
First Actual Use Reports.
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sharing allotment to the local anti-poverty agency for social
services. Spearheading this action was writer and
professor of Urban Affairs, Samuel Kaplan, who explained,
"Revenue sharing is consistent with the Nixon Administra-
tions benign neglect of anti-poverty matters." 81 Not sur-
prisingly, the national public affairs manager of the ORS
was unable to name many other examples of similar action
around the country.82 More typical was the town of Redding,
Connecticut which was forced to debate the respective
merits of tennis courts, bridle paths, or a dog pound.83
Expenditure behavior which de-emphasizes social spend-
ing has obvious detrimental effects on minorities and the
poor. Efforts by concerned iinterest groups to reshape local
spending priorities will be addressed in the third chapter
of this paper. Suffice it to say that the simultaneous
advent of revenue sharing and the prospect of federal budget
cuts for other federal aid programs (which has been
termed the "pincer effect") motivated stronger citizen in-
volvement in the budget process than would have been the
case had either of these developments occurred alone. 84
At the same time that some affluent cities wonder what
to do with revenue sharing funds, more concentrated urban
centers wonder how to cope with widening budget deficits.
In the first year of GRS, the State of Massachusetts lost
over $7 million dollars, according to the Massachusetts
86
Taxpayers Foundation. Cities like Boston, Quincy, and
Cambridge, with substantial low-income populations report
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that the effects of Federal cutbacks are "chilling".8 7
Flaws in the distribution process of revenue sharing funds
spill over into expenditure patterns. Some local govern-
ments have received unneeded funds, others with escalating
demands for services are funded inadequately, and without
limitations on use, many governments are structuring spend-
ing priorities which perpetuate inequities between the
haves and have nots.
MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The other dimension of the fiscal plight of cities is
the inadequacy of local planning and management. Theoretically,
the substitution of federal funds for local tax dollars would
help municipalities hold down tax rates; making it easier
for them to support industry and to attract upper income
people back to the center of the city. However, a great
number of the difficulties at the local level stem from
inherent management problems, a situation which is not
likely to be improved by the inflow of untied federal funds. 8 8
There is evidence that at least ideologically, the
public is aware of this municipal management situation..
A 1973 survey by the Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations, conducted among 2,023 men and women, asked'
the following question:
When the Federal Government gives funds to state
and local governments, do you feel that the money
is used more efficiently when it is given out for
41
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specific purposes, or when it is'given out for
the state and local governments to use as they
think best?
Forty-eight per cent of those questioned voted in favor of
the earmarked approach, and 30% thought that state and
local governments should make their own decisions. Twenty-
two percent had no opinion. It is interesting to note that
among non-white respondents, only 19% trusted decisions to
state and local governments. Over half of this group felt
that funds were best used when given out for specific purposes.89
The same survey found that in both 1972 and 1973, the property
tax was ranked as the worst or least fair of all the major
revenue producers.
Former Presidential Adviser on Domestic Affairs, John
Erlichman declared his own "law of gravity" with regard to
revenue sharing operations. His law contended that as local
governments are given more responsibility they will be run
by better officials and more streamlined structures. Block
grants- without strings were his prescription for the "physiology
of atrophy" of the state and local governments.90 The
experience of the State of Alabama with LEAA block funding
challenges the validity of Erlichman's law. The Alabama
LEAA program was plagued with payroll irregularities and
faulty accounting procedures. The state spent some of its
funds for scholarships for sons of police chiefs, and for
1,000 McDonald's hamburgers to be eaten at a governors con-
ference on narcotics. LEAA finally set up a training program
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for 210 state auditors. No such training provision exists
in GRS.9 1
As mentioned previously, Susskind's in-depth study of
the LEAA found that most participating states duplicated
the same bureaucratic confusion and paper work that sparked
92
criticism of federal categorical grants. Susskind also
found that innovation in grant allocation was perceived as
risky by state administrators. Grants were more likely to
go to professional provider groups than to consumer organiza-
tions who might propose counter institutional projects
93
which threatened existing professional norms.
A number of the original advocates of revenue sharing,
led by Congressman Henry Reuse, thought that the federal
government should use its influence and money to help improve
the management and administration of state and local govern-
ment. Revenue sharing was seen as a means to that end. Reuss
explained that states need a "financial catalyst rather than
a financial crutch", in order to get moving towards needed
reforms. 94
H.R. 11764 introduced in May of 1969 was proposed by
Reuss in order to arrange a marriage of revenue sharing and
local government modernization. Under the Congressman's
plan, block grants would have been given to states and local-
ities on the condition that each state prepare a modern
governments program which detailed its plan to invigorate
its own administration and those of constituent local
governments. This bill anticipated revenue sharing's strong
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tendency to sustain state's irresponsibilities toward- local
governments, and administrative inadequacies at the level of
95the municipal budget. Unfortunately its influence on the
GRS legislation proved minimal. GRS exhibits little impetus
for local government reform.
C. The Office of Revenue Sharing and Civil Rights
Enforcement.
Sufficient evidence exists to substantiate doubts
about the administration of the national GRS program. The
laissez-faire attitude of the Treasury Department and the
Office of Revenue Sharing belies provisions in the 1972 GRS
Act which supposedly ensure accountability. One of the most
important of these regulations is a repetition of Title VI
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. This provision is a broad
prohibition on use of ,federal funds for projects in which
racial, and now sexual, discrimination is practiced. Unlike
the F'air Housing Act, and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act, the details of enforcing this provision of the State
and Local Fiscal Assistance Act are left to states and local-
ities; entities which historically have proved least adept
at civil rights enforcement.
The ORS regulation presents a weaker explanation of
administrative interpretation of the GRS prohibition of dis-
crimination than do Title VI regulations of the Title VI
prohibition. An in-depth analysis of all the civil rights
I.
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activities of ORS by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights97
criticizes the ORS regulation for omission of a number of
important points:
1. A statement that the listing of specific discrim-
inatory acts prohibited by the regulations is not
exhaustive, but merely suggestive. A statement
such as that contained in the- HEW Title VI regula-
tions would notify GRS recipients that they must
consider all discriminatory implications when
handling or spending GRS funds.
2. A statement that the assurances required by
the regulation shall be subject to judicial
enforcement by the Federal government.
3. A requirement, for any real property acquired
or improved with GRS funds, that there be a cov-
enant running with the land, upon any subsequent
transfer, to assure non-discrimination, at least
where upon any such transfer, the real property is
to be used for the same purpose as that for which
the GRS recipient acquired or improved the property.
4. In order to enhance the ability of women
and minority citizens to have effective input
into spending decisions, a provision that specific
discriminatory practices prohibited include denial
of an equal opportunity for minorities and women
to participate as members of planning or advisory
bodies in connection with the disposition of GRS
funds, at least where such bodies are composed
6f appointed citizens.
5. To prevent narrow interpretation of the
non-discrimination provision, a statement that
prohibition of discrimination in services extends
to services made available in a facility provided'
in whole or in part with GRS funds.
6. So that it is clear that vestiges of past
discrimination must not be permitted to persist,
a provision that where past unlawful discrimination
has occurred, recipients must act affirmatively to
overcome any of its present effects.
7. A provision that recipients must compile
and maintain racial and ethnic data, by sex," in
relation to programs and activites funded in whole
or in part with GRS funds. This type of information
63
could document the degree to 'whi'ch minorities and
number among those who are eligible and those who
actually participate in, or derivebenefits from
services or facilities in programs provided with
GRS funds. 98
Under the broad ORS regulation, discrimination in any
program or activity funded in whole or part with entitle-
ment funds made pursuant to subtitle A or Title I of the Act
on the grounds of race, color, national origin, or sex is
99
prohibited. If revenue sharing funds are going to a
government activity in which there is discrimination, either
in hiring, promotion, or the delivery of services by employees,
cause lies for seeking administrative remedies, or initiat-
ing a law suit.
The task of reviewing and bringing- into compliance
the political jurisdictions subject to the revenue sharing
act is delegated to ORS, which maintains a staff of only
100
68 people. At the ,time of the hearings before the House
Judiciary Committee on the civil rights aspects of GRS, the
compliance division of ORS consisted of three professionals,
responsible for monitoring the millions of revenue sharing
dollars yearly expended by all recipient units of government.101
Described by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights as "one
of the most poorly staffed and funded civil rights compliance
programs in the Federal Government," it is not surprising
that ORS is limited in its administrative capacity to keep
track of and enforce compliance reviews. However, substantial
evidence exists that ORS does not even take actions which are
possible within its regource constraints in order to make
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its complaince effort viable.10 2
ORS makes the unwarranted assumption that GRS -recip-
ients will readily adhere to program anti-discrimination
requirements, even though the most cursory review of state
and local governments actions with regard to public school
desegregation, provision of bilingual services, supply of
municipal services, housing discrimination, voting rights,
and public employment, gives ample testimony to the contrary.103
The regulations fail to offer any adequate guidelines in
monitoring sex discrimination, and equal opportunity in
employment, under the excuse that sufficient guidelines for
104
these infractions already exist elsewhere.
One, relatively superficial, part of the ORS compliance
program is the obtaining of assurances, or written form
statements, from each recipient government that it will be
in compliance with the provisions of the Act.105 Another
stage in the ORS compliance program consists of compliance
visits which have been made to about 100 of the largest
recipient jurisdictions. This one-time survey was comprised
of half-day to full day visits conducted by an auditor, and
a person with program experience who conducted three ox four
106
interviews with recipient governments. Despite ORS'
contention that these visits could measure compliance with
the Act, the questions asked on the compliance checklist
related only to the recipients' means of assuring compliance,
107
and not to whether or not they were in compliance. The
compliance report revealed some evidence of misunderstanding
41
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among local government officials regarding the scope of
state and local civil rights agencies and laws in relation
to revenue sharing:
... a number of officials responsible for
the revenue sharing program are not fully
aware of civil rights enforcement organizations
able to assist in ensuring non-discriminatory
use of revenue sharing funds. 108
In fact, according to the U.S. Commission of Civil
Rights report, ORS found one state chief budget officer who
was completely unaware of the existence of his state's
. ..109
civil rights agency.
Auditing is the main devise for ensuring compliance
with the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act. Section 51.41(c)
of the revenue sharing regulation states:
it is the intention of the Secretary to rely
to the maximum extent possible on audits
of recipient governments by state and local
government auditors and independent public
accountants. 110
However, the Audit Guide is inadequate for any systematic
determination of possible non-compliance. Auditors are
not directed to collect or review racial and ethnic data
by sex of employees of the eligible and actual beneficiary
population for programs and activities fundedwi-.h GRS
money. Apart from the specific siting of facilities, a
measure limited to obviously discriminatory evidence, no
specific inquiry designed to determine actual co'mpliance is
directed.11 2
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Complaint processing is an important, perhaps too
important, mechanism in the fulfillment of the Treasury
Secretary's responsibility to ensure civil rights compliance.
Yet for a significant part of the initial operation of the
GRS program, ORS did little do make clear to citizens
113
methods by which they could file complaints. When asked
by a member of the House Judiciary Committee how a citizen
who may not be as well off would know about his or her right
to make a complaint, Graham Watt, the Director of ORS
replied, "There is no requirement or provision in the law or
the regulations that would address itself to that point".
Later he went on to say that the Actual and Planned Use
Reports which the law requires recipient jurisdictions to
publish in a newspaper of general circulation, would serve
114
that purpose. Because of the ORS delay in publicizing
information about complaint filing, the volume of civil
rights complaints submitted to ORS has been understandably
small. Only 93 complaints had been received as of October
1151974. Ironically, the ORS Director sees the low rate of
complaints as an indication of a high rate of compliance.11 6
It seems that when non-compliance is discovered,,
ORS is reluctant to use the deferral of funds as a sanction.
A recent suit, Renault Robinson v. George P. Schultz, Civil
No. 74-248 (D.C.D.C., Feb. 1974), brought in Chicago by the
Afro-American Patrolmen's League of Illinois, and the Chicago
branch of the NAACP asked the court to take administrative
I.
67
action against the city of Chicago to -enforce the anti-dis-
crimination provisions of the revenue sharing law.. The
court was asked to prohibit ORS from disbursing any additional
general revenue sharing funds to the city of Chicago until
the police department there had been found to be in compliance
with all applicable anti-discrimination requirements.
After the administrative petition was filed, ORS
notified those filing the petition that while the discrimina-
tion issue was in court, it did not have authority to
withhold funds from Chicago. The civil rights complainants
did not agree. Their position was that ORS can withhold
funds and enforce penalities against the city. The basic
issue at stake was whether ORS followed the intent of the
revenue sharing law and regulations.11 8
Plaintiffs initial motion for preliminary injunction
under 31 U.S.C. §1242(6) was denied, the court feeling that
the issues were not sufficiently ripe to compel the Secretary
of the Treasury to defer payment of revenue sharing funds
to the city government for payments to its police department.
Yet the court recognized the inherent authority of agencies
to defer payments of federal financial assistance pending
the outcome of administrative proceedings citing Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000d-l Board of
Public Instruction of Palm Beach v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 1201
(C.A. 5th 1969) and of Congress' recognition of this authority
as evidenced by the "Fountain Amendment," 42 U.S.C. §2000d-5.
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Secretary of the Treasury failed'to secure the compliance
of the Governor of Illinois to the antigiscriminatory
provisions of 31 U.S.C. §1242(a). Section 1242(b), 31
U.S.C. provides that when the Secretary has determined that
compliance cannot be secured, he is authorized to proceed
in one of three ways:
1. to refer the matter to the Attorney General
with a recommendation that an appropriate
civil action be instituted;
2. to exercise the powers and functions provided
by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; or
3. to take such other action as may be required
by law.
The Secretary elected torefer the matter to the
Attorney General. Plaintiffs renewed their motion for
summary judgment in which they sought to enjoin further
payment of revenue sharing to the city of Chicago for its
police department until compliance had been determined. The
motion was denied.
a
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III. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
A. Introduction
The inequitable method by which revenue sharing
funds are distributed, the questionable priorities employed
by States in spending those funds, and the laissez-faire
manner in which ORS performs its compliance functions are
all major determinants of the implications of revenue sharing
for minorities and low-income people. There is another set
of questions which concern this interest group, in addition
to the aforementioned fiscal, administrative, and legal issues.
This dimension of revenue sharing is citizen participation;
the access afforded those affected by federal programs to
contribute to the decision-making and implementation process.
This chapter will consider citizen participation in GRS
and SRS in several different contexts. The first is histor-
ical. As previous chapters have noted, the revenue-sharing
philosophy differs from that of the categorical grant programs
which-preceeded it in a number of different ways. Foremost
among these is the locus of funding decisions. When con-
trasted to the OEO Community Action Programs and the HUD
Model Cities, revenue sharing represents a shift back 'to the
notion of local control by local officials. The decade
of the '60's saw an unprecedented federal recognition of one
community self-determination concept. The OEO standard of
decision-making initially delegated a large amount of author-
ity to indigeneous low-income residents. For the first time
community people, an appellation which became synonymous
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with poor and/or minority, became equal actors at the
bargaining table where local policy was 'determined. The
federal mandate for participation gave them leverage
against city hall and the ability to negotiate services
which had previously been undelivered.
Model cities continued the practice of federally
determined target areas, still under the assumption that
domestic policy with regard to the cities was a national
rather than local responsibility. Though more final
authority rested with mayors in model cities than had been
the case with the OEO programs, residents of target areas
did exercise varying levels of participation in project
operations.
The status of client groups in general and special
revenue sharing harkens back to the limited advisory
functions performed by citizens in Urban Renewal Programs.
Discretion of how intimately community people will be
involved in the workings of local projects funded by revenue
money, lies with mayors and the bureaucracies which comprise
city governments. Community initiative is the sole impetus
for inclusion of citizens in decision-making capacitie§.
The legislative guidelines for citizen participation in
GRS programs are cursory, and it is surely not in- the inter-
ests of city halls to go out and organize the poor for
intervention strategies. Though the requirements for citizen
participation in Special Revenue Sharing are ,somewhat less
salutory, the overall effect of the entire revenue sharing
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philosophy is benign neglect of the rights of the poor to
contribute to programs which affect them.
After discussing the legacy of citizen participation
left by the Urban Renewal, Community Action, and Model
Cities programs, this chapter will focus on various inter-
vention strategies employed thus far by citizens groups in
General Revenue Sharing. Since in many cities GRS funds
became part of all municipal monies, citizen action must
encompass a study of the entire budgetary process in order
to determine uses of revenue sharing dollars. As interest
groups become more aware of the workings of their city
budgets, the possibilities increase for them to use GRS
monitoring activity as a lever for participation in a wide
range of spending decisions. Such instances are few, however,
and one of the most vital revisions that can be suggested
for the GRS program, if extended, is a widening of of. access
routes for citizens to participate in local allocation decisions.
The final section of this chapter turns attention to
Special Revenue Sharing, specifically citizen participation
in.the application for funds under the 1974 Housing and
Community development Act. Case studies of two citizens
groups in the Boston area, one in Newton, the other in Rox-
bury, provide the information for this section. -Since at
the time of this'writing CDRS funds have been applied for,
but not yet received from the Treasury Department, im-
plications about community involvement in the actual admin-
istration of those funds will be speculative. Probably more
I.
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than any other component of the entire revenue-sharing
package, Community Development Revenue Sharing (CDRS) is
linked to prior HUD procedures.. Because .CDRS supercedes
only categorical grants administered by HUD, the possibilities
for citizen participation more closely approximate former
legislative guidelines.
A number of points should be made before proceding.
These include.a general background on federal policy, (or
lack of federal policy) for citizen participation in funding
programs, as well as definitions of terms which will be
used throughout, in discussing the citizen participation issue.
The legislative and administrative guidelines for
citizen participation in varipus federal programs have
never been clear. The government in Washington has never
established a consistent policy with regard to involvement
of citizens in its grant programs, and so as each new
federal program is launched, a different sort of official
citizen participation requirement is mandated. Urban
Renewal's "workable program" requirement, the "maximum
feasible participation",2 called for by OEO Community Action
Program legislation, and the "widespread participation"3
required in the Model Cities program are all examples of
federal stipulations for citizen access. However, none of
these requirements have been stated precisely and exhaustively
in the original enabling Acts, so the substance of citizen
participation has been subject to myriad administrative
interpretations. The ambiguity of federal citizen participation
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regulations has meant a weakening of access to decision
making for poor people, and a lack of p9litical leverage for
minorities who have traditionally been disenfranchised by
the political system. At the local administrative level,
grant program officials have been confused as to the sanctions
for involvement of neighborhood residents and in many cases
have chosen to ignore the question altogether.
Besides the ambiguity of federal regulations, several
other questions are important in the dynamics of participa-
tion. Two of these questions are "who are the participants?",
and "what constitutes participation?" Never defined federally,
and rarely agreed upon locally, these two questions have
always been a source of conflict between program officials
and neighborhood people, as well as among neighbors them-
selves.
To ask "who are the participants?" is to raise the issue
of representativeness: Urban renewal officials thought
that they satisfied requirements to represent citizen
interests by including a variety of business and professional
leaders in their elite Citizen Advisory Committees. In
this case, "participants" were those who could be benefactors
of the federal program, and whose support was needed to make
the project viable locally. The Economic Opportunity Act
reversed this position and focused attention on the poor.
In the Community Actions programs, "participants"
included the low-income people who were the targets of the.
program. The Model Cities program also recognized the need
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to represent indigenous residents of the Model Cities area.
The rationale behind LBJ's "peaceful revolution" was to use
federally inspired community organizations to put power in
the hands of the urban poor, so that they could demand
4
services from city hall. Nixon's concept of "the people"
or citizens who were to participate, emerged as those
constituents whose vested interests lie in maintaining
traditional power relationships, the so-called "silent
majority" who even presume that the status quo can remain un-
threatened and intact. Consequently, when proponents of the
New Federalism talked about bringing government "back to
the people" they have meant putting federal money in the
hands of elected and state officials so that they can better
control services originating from city hall.
Fragmentation at the community level is a major hurdle
for neighborhood organizers. The three descriptions of
Urban Renewal projects in Boston illustrate the intricate
and sometimes impossible task of coalescing neighborhood
interests. In predominately white, largely blue-collar Charles-
town, neighbors are fiercely individualstic, and though they
presented a united front on upholding the viability of'their
territory, it was, only with great difficulty that organizers
were able to reach consensus or guidelines for, redevelopment.
In predominately black Washington Park, cleavages formed
along class lines. Alliances between middle-income residents
and the BRA enabled them to override the concerns of the
black poor. The West End residents lacked the political
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savvy and organizational capacity of either of the afore-
mentioned communities, and unable to mobilize in their own
self-interests, they surrendered their territory entirely.
Just- as the fact that all participants are poor, or
all from the same ethnic minority does not answer the question
of representativeness, the fact that all participants are
from the same neighborhood is no guarantee for consensus.
As the case studies of citizen participation in community
development revenue sharing will discuss at the end of this
chapter, differing interest groups within neighborhoods
can complicate the overall effort to deal with program
officials and the city bureaucracy.
The second question inherent in citizen involvement,
"what constitutes participation?", raises the issue of the
substance of citizen action. The motivation for people to
organize their involvementthe relationship which those
citizens have to established bases of power, and the degree
of influence which they are able to exert on the planning
and implementation process, are all important facets of
participation. A number of authors have developed hypotheses
about the nature of participation. Sherry Arnstein, former
chief. advisor on citizen participation in the HUD Model
Cities Administration, structured a "ladder of citizen
participation" which delineates three degrees of possible
involvement.5 The lowest degree of Arnistein's ladder,
"non-involvement", has two levels, or rungs. Th'ese are
"manipulation", and "therapy". The next degree of involve-
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ment on the ladder is "tokenism", which encompasses the
rungs of "informing", "consultation", ad "placation".
The highest degree of involvement according to Arnstein,
is actual "participation". The rungs subsumed under this
category are "partnership", "delegated power" and "citizen
control." In her studies of Model Cities Programs,
Arnstein concluded:
participation without redistribution of power
is an empty and frustrating process for
the powerless. It allows the power holders to
claim that all sides were considered, but makes
it possible for only some of these sides to
benefit. It maintains the status quo. 6
Melvin Mogulof views participation as a series of acts by
which the citizen has the opportunity to influence the dis-
tribution of benefits or losses which may be visited upon
him, (or upon those he represents), as a result of federally
supported programs. 7Mogulof's research also provides five
useful categories for classifying the intensity of citizen
parti-cipation: (a) employment - information, (b) consulta-
tion - advice, (c) consultation - advice with independent
8-
resources, (d) shared authority, (e) control.
The role and conduct of technical or professional people
charged with the responsibility of implementing a federal
program has important implications for citizen participation.
Theorizing on the role of planners in the participation
process, and recognizing that the professional must consider
the operations of three groups, the client, the established
order,- and the participants, Sima Osdoby of the Boston
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Transportation Planning Review, suggests that there are
five dimensions to the planner's role"
1. the planner's work style, that is whether
the person is a "technician planner" or an
"administrative planner"
2. the perceived client;-i.e., whose community,
sub-group, neighborhood or institution
3. the auspices under which the planner works,
i.e., for a public or a private agency,
4. the problem orientation, whether it is
related to land use/physical planning, social
policy, etc.
95. the planner's race.
An array of appropriate and inappropriate roles are
also options for professional, planners and the chapter which
follows will examine several of these. 'The Cambridge Urban
Renewal project which successfully included a measure of
citizen input, illustrates the potentially positive contribu-
tion of an advocacy pl'anner who assumes an educator, informa-
tion disseminator role. The interraction between the staff
of the CDA in Boston's Model Cities program, and community
members of the Model Neighborhood Board, exemplifies the
success which planners can have in the communicator, consultant
role. On the negative side, the reluctance of West End
planning officials to establish any meaningful and informative
dialogues with the neighborhood, shows the danger of
professionals who assume a manipulator, obfuscator, role.
The body of this chapter is written from the standpoint
that participants are the group or groups of program constituents
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for whom benefits are promised, to whom program administrators
and the bureaucracy should be but seldom are, accountable,
and for whom avenues of intervention are nationally
defined and enforced. The implicit assumption is made that
the pendulum of community influence and access to decision
making which previously had swung away from passive advisory
roles of the Urban Renewal citizen committees, to increasingly
activist demands for community control during the CAP and
Model Cities programs, is now swinging back to less intense
forms of federally mandated involvement. The context of
revenue sharing is one in which community people must
strive in almost totally self-initiated ways to maximize
their positions within an advisory framework.
B. Lessons Learned from Categorical Grant Programs
1. Urban Renewal
The almost two decades of Urban Renewal projects
provide the baseline for citizen involvement in federal
programs, corresponding to what would probably be the lowest
degrees on Arnsteins ladder, non-participation and tokenism.
Citizen participation in Urban Renewal depended largely on
local initiative, with little support from either local
governments or the local agencies designated to implement
redevelopment schemes. The only real legislative require-
ment for citizen participation is a 1954 congressional amend-
ment to the Housing Act of 1949. The program haa been in
operation several years by this point, and federal authorities
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felt the need to switch renewal emphasis from demolition to
11
rehabilitation. Neighborhood rehabilitation implied that
social as well as physical concerns were to be taken into
account by renewal planners, so some recognition was given
to the basic, though limited, need to involve lay citizens,
as a means of legitimatizing the redevelopment process at
12the city level.
According to the 1954 amendment, cities were required
to devise a "workable program" as a precondition to receiv-
ing federal monies.13 The workable program was supposed to
include an official plan of action for dealing with the
problem of urban slums, and for the establishment and preserva-
14tion of a well-planned community. Seven requirements
which were to constitute a workable program were promulgated
by the Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency
(HHFA). The last of these was "citizen particiation. "1 5
Since Congress made no further specific directives as
to the form which this citizen participation was to take,
the mandate for community involvement in Urban Renewal
remained nebulous thoroughout the life of the program.
One consequence is clear, however. Urban Renewal's involve-
ment of lay citizens was limited to middle-class business
and professional interests, most often at the city
level. "Participants" in the Urban Renewal did not mean low-
income people in neighborhoods scheduled for slum clearance
16
and rehabilitation. As political scientist James Q. Wilson
observed twelve years ago, in his critique of Urban Renewal,
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"middle-class persons who are beneficiaries of rehabilitation
will be planned with; lower class persops who are dis-
advantaged by renewal will be planned without. "17
Consistent with the middle-class orientation of Urban
Renewal, the HHFA envisioned city-wide citizens advisory
committees (CAC's) as appropriate focii for development.
The CAC's were supposed to consider specific socially-
oriented renewal problems such as minority housing and neigh-
18borhood participation. In most cities the CAC's never
performed more than a perfunctory role in approving decisions
handed down by the Local Public Agency. Usually the position
of the CAC was too closely aligned to that of the LPA,
to allow independent thinking, on the part of the advisory body.
The membership of the Committees were often too large and
overstructured to define policy, and despite the over-
abundance of business and professional leadership technical
capacity and planning 'expertise of the CAC's was insufficient
to produce discriminating evaluation of redevelopment proposals.1 9
City-Wide Groups in Boston
Boston's experience with city-wide groups and Urban
Renewal is a good example of the limitations of both an
advisory status, and a strictly middle-class orientation.
The approval of the citizen participation component of
Boston's workable program in 1955, led to the establishment
of a 100 man committee.20 A predecessor to an etren larger
CAC established some years later, the committee included
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notables and local elites dedicated to industrial and commercial
21development. This first committee represented the use of
a professional community organization approach to citizen
participation in order to achieve local support of renewal.
There is little evidence of concrete gains made by this body
either in funneling up support from the neighborhood level,
or in influencing the intention of the LPA.2 2
In 1963 a larger CAC had been established, partly out
of political considerations. Shortly before his bid for re-
election, Mayor Collins, a Democrat, decided to appoint a
large number of prominent Republicans to serve on the Urban
Renewal advisory committee. It is safe to assume that Collins
was motivated as much by campaign strategy as by HHFA
pressure to fulfill the citizen participation requirement,
when he assembled this unwieldly body.23 Predictably, the
CAC became an arm of the Boston Redevelopment Authority,
the local agency funded to execute the renewal program. In
what amounted to a relationship too close for even object-
ive advisory action, the BRA supplied at least one staff
person to each CAC subcommittee, and also payed the salary
of the overall committee coordinator.24 Moreover, the
Committee had gotten underway too late, and understood too
little, to have substantial input in formulating renewal
schemes. From its position at the end of the planning process,
the CAC was forced to either accept totally each BRA
renewal plan, or to reject it altogether. Only the former option
was ex6rcised.25
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Even in the late '60's when the heyday of Boston.'s Urban
Renewal projects was over, and the effegts of more radical
OEO, and Model Cities approaches to citizen involvement were
being felt, Boston's city-wide CAC retained its elitist
character, and emphasis on business and professional
interests. A partial list of subcommittees and the private
capacities of their chairman underscores this fact:
- Capital Improvements -- Executive Secretary,
Boston Municipal Research Bureau;
- Community Planning -- President of a Savings
Institute;
- Home Financing -- major bank representative;
- Rehabilitation -- major utilities representative.26
The CAC chairman was a lawyer with a major downtown Boston
law firm, and the vice chairman was the project coordinator
for a major private utility.
When time came to'submit the 1970 Workable Program to
HUD for re-certification, the 300 man CAC had become
"virtually moribund."28 Experience at the neighborhood level
with specific urban renewal projects led Mayor.White to
pay closer attention to the demands of grass-roots citizens
groups for inclusion in the renewal planning process. The
CAC became less and less important as the mayor instituted
a more decentralized citizen involvement system.29 The
CAC was replaced by the Boston Urban Affairs Committee
(BUAC), a 58 member group which according to the*1970 Workable
41
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Program was to be ".an assembly of articulate and concerned
representatives of Boston's residential committees and
special interest groups."30 Though initially the
BUAC did include more representation of low-income and
minority people than previous CAC's, its effectiveness de-
creased in direct proportion to dwindling attendance at its
meetings, and a year after it was originated the BUAC was
a less than significant part of the renewal planning process.31
Urban Renewal At The Neighborhood Level
While the record of city-wide citizen participation in
Urban Renewal is relatively consistent, varying- only within
a limited advisory framework,, the record of participation
at the neighborhood level reveals a slightly wider range
of involvement, though still within a narrow recommendatory
capacity. Instances of "non-participation" at the neighbor-
hood level range from 'complete disregard of community appeals
to inclusion of neighborhood people in actual planning
procedures. The three examples which follow indicate various
degrees of participation, or non-participation by Boston
community people in three Urban Renewal projects, in the
West End, Charlestown, and Washington Park respectively.
(a) The West End
Nationally, as well as locally, one of the most
vivid instances of the ravages of the federal bulldozer
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was the West End redevelopment project. One of the first
renewal schemes in the country, the West End redevelopment
was conceived and implemented without even neighborhood
approval of, let alone participation in renewal plans.
A classic study of this urban community and the impediments
to its access to the planning process, is provided by
Herbert Gans.3 2
Gans reveals cultural and social, as well as circum-
stantial impediments to participation by West Enders in the
renewal scheme which ultimately destroyed their neighborhood.
According to his findings, oncoming redevelopment had little
meaning to the 20,000 low-income people who lived in the area.
Despite the fact that clearan'ce plans were first made
public in 1951, it was not until the final contract was
signed in 1958 that West Enders realized the finality of the
Urban Renewal demolition scheme. 3 3
The reasons for-their disbelief and inability to
organize effectively to save their neighborhood were many.
The complex and seemingly endless series of planning proposals
which were steps in the BRA development process were mis-
understood by people in the neighborhood. What in reality
was an incremental planning and implementation procedure,
was perceived by West Enders to be a purposeless-and erratic
train of events which ultimately would change nothing.3 4
Poor information dissemination also contributed to
neighborhood ignorance. Media coverage and gLgency communica-
tion was sporadic. Official announcements from the BRA were
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vague, and neighborhood people consequently paid little
attention to printed information. As time went on, word of
impending redevelopment and relocation plans was dismissed
as a scare tactic to get West Enders to give their homes.3 5
Elements of the socio-cultural fabric of West End life
made it difficult for them to comprehend the concept of
turning neighborhood land over to private developers, who
would in turn reap a profit on the construction of luxury
and middle-income housing. Some area people reasoned that
"only in Russia could the government deprive citizens of
their property in such a manner." 36
The "Save the West End Committee", begun in 1956,
attempted toilluminate the realities of -forthcoming Urban
Renewal events, but did not succeed in mobilizing neigh-
borhood support until it was too late. Part of the failure
of this Committee was due to the nature of its leadership.
The head of the group was an outsider, a leading member
of one of upper-class Boston's more prominent families,
whose ancestors had established a tradition of settlement
37
house work in the West End. Other members of the Committee
were part of the fringes rather than the mainstream of West
End life; and consequently the group never sustained enough
local impact to either sway the official plann'in4 bureaucracy,
or convert the West Enders to the principles of organized
38
activity.
Even when demolition was eminent, for people who lacked
a rudimentary understanding of city politics and the renewal
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planning process, saving their homes in the West End seemed
an impossible task. West Enders did not have sufficient
contact with the political system to realize that the go,
no-go, decisions on renewal, rested with forces more powerful
than the Mayor. Their final and fruitless hope was that
if he changed his mind their neighborhood would be saved.
Politically, the community was virtually disenfranchised.
Local politicians opposed the redevelopment, but were not
strong enough to override more powerful city interest groups
who favored it.39 The West End did not enjoy the positive
visibility of the North End, which though populated by low
and moderate income people was the symbol of Italian life in
Boston and as such enjoyed a broader base of political
alliance.40
In the end, the noise of buildings being torn down,
and the fear of vandalism forced even the most vigilant of
West Enders to give up and leave. The West End was emptied
in little more than 18 months after official taking of the
land.41
(b) Charlestown
Memories of the West End had a profound effect on
the subsequent reception of Urban Renewal plans by other
Boston neighborhoods. When residents of Charlestown heard
of newly arrived BRA director Ed Logue's plans to use their
neighborhood as a showcase for renewal in Boston*, they were
swift, unanimous, and vocal in expressing their discontent.42
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Unlike the West Enders, blue-collar Charlestonians did have
-jthe political where ithal and organizat'ional capacity to
defend themselves, and the record of the renewal planning
process in Charlestown is the history of neighborhood people
who strove to drive the hardest possible bargain with the
43
director of the BRA. Two major public hearings by the BRA
were held in Charlestown, one in 1963 where the announcement
of renewal plans were greeted with hisses and boos from a
hostile community, and another two years later when the BRA
achieved a majority vote of approval for its revised renewal
schemes.44 The time between these two hearings was filled
with political infighting, and heated debates between loyal
Charlestonians adamant about preserving their working class
environment, and BRA planners who were insensitive to the
character of the community and unable to understand the
distribution of local power. 45
As described by 'Langley Keyes in his review of the
"planning game" in Charlestown, residents of that community
enjoyed a self-contained identity which was wildly democratic,
relatively xenophobic and which compensated in local political
awareness for what was lacked in far-reaching politicai
clout at the city or state level.4 6  Happy with the general
state of their homes, and distrustful of what th y supposed
to be, the "fancy" middle-income orientation of the BRA,
Charlestonians bristled at the mention of their community as
a "blighted area."4 7
t.
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In contrast to other areas encountering renewal projects,
reaction to Urban Renewal in CharlestowR could not be
delineated along class lines. For one thing, the poorest
Charlestonians were largely unaffected by the proposed
rehabilitation process since most of them occupied public
housing in a section of the town not slated for clearance
48
or rehabilitation. Also, despite variations in income,
the vast majority of people in Charlestown considered them-
selves to be working class. Differentiations among
neighbors were made more on the basis of religious parish,
49than family financial resources.
Though perceived common denominators were strong,
Charlestonians proved highly, individualistic, and engaged
in a lot of political infighting. Unlike the West End,
however, the several community groups in Charlestown were
able to channel public anti-renewal feeling into a platform
with which to negotiate with BRA officials.50
The first committee formed to deal with the BRA renewal
planners for Charlestown was the Self-Help-Organization-
Charlestown SHOC). For several years, from 1960 to 1962
SHOC performed its organizational advisory function smoothly
during what Keyes calls the "era of good feeling" between the
51
neighborhood and the BRA project director. Gradually, there
came a change of local actors, specifically the project
director, and a shift in community sentiment away from the
SHOC position. Pressure was brought to bear on 'SHOC to
incorporate a wider range of citizen representation, and to
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consider incorporation into the newly conceived Federation
of Charlestown, an organization supported by the BRA.5 2
SHOC resisted this suggestion vehemently.
Local suspicions of BRA motives and tensions between
SHOC and the Federation peaked in January 1963 at the
first public hearing staged by the BRA to announce renewal
plans. There was growing public feeling that the BRA
planners were preventing Charlestonians. from their right
to be involved. A scene of chaos reigned as Logue attempted
to present the BRA's proposals, in the face of-booing and
cat calls from angry townspeople.53 This emphatic reaction
made clear to Logue for the first time that the BRA-endorsed
Federation had failed to neutralize community opposition.
After. the 1963 hearing three district groups emerged.
It was clear that the Federation,composed largely of clergy
in favor of renewal, represented only one point of view.
Also to be reckoned with were the "moderate middle", a
group whose stance was neither categorically for nor against
renewal, and SHOC, which gradually solidified into a band
of people opposed to renewal on any terms.5 4  Shrew.-
maneuvering by the BRA, and a door-to-door selling approach
by the new project director, slowly transformed community
sentiment during the next two years. By appealing to the
"moderate middle;" planning officials managed to affect a
coalition between that group and the Federation, isolating
SHOC in a "radical" stance. By the time a second hearing was
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staged in March of 1965, the vote taken yielded about 2,000
for and 700 against the proposed renewal plan.5 5
Though the BRA was able to proceed with its renewal
program, it was not without important concessions to the
priorities of the Charlestown community. The removal of
the El, always an important item on the neighborhood agenda,
required a commitment from the BRA of $12,000,000, nearly
one-third the total estimated project cost.56 The revised
renewal plan also included provisions for a Massachusetts
Bay Community College, an item which assured support from
a large number of Charlestownians.57
(c) Washington Park
A third instance of urban renewal in Boston is the
Washington Park project, in Roxbury. This project illus-
trates not only ways in which neighborhood people can
function smoothly in-advisory roles to the BRA, but more
importantly, ways in which citizen participation can come
to include only selected groups of neighbors. More than
either of the preceeding cases, Washington Park makes clear
the distinctions between socio-economic classes within' a
neighborhood, and their stance viz ' viz renewal plans.
In Washington Park, BRA plans were presented to a
relatively stratified community, e.g., the shrinking minority,
of whites left from the Roxbury of decades past, the "Negro
elite" who occupied the highest echelons of the black socio-
economic ladder, and the blue-collar workers who represented
101
the majority of Roxbury residents. As early as the 1950's,
all these groups looked to Urban Renewal as a means of saving
58their neighborhood. Fearing the downward spiral which
might eventually relegate Roxbury to slum status, and anxious
about the growing numbers of low-income blacks and Puerto
Ricans migrating in from other cities, members of the white
minority, Negro elite, and black working class favored
urban renewal.as a way of clearing the area of unwanted low-
income and slum housing (and its occupants) and as a means
of stabilizing the middle-class and interracial component
of what they hoped would not become an all-black and dis-
advantaged community.59 The Washington Park project was
approved in 1959.60
Thus when Ed Logue arrived on the scene, neighborhood
support for urban renewal in Washington Park was a fait
accompli. Rather than embark on its own campaign effort
to organize citizen pariticipation, the BRA chose to fund an
existing organization, Freedom House, in order to structure
local participants and make plans for relocation.61 Freedom
House had been founded in 1949 by a black couple, Muriel
and Otto Snowden, who as members of the "Negro elite" were
committed to reversing what they perceived as the increasing
deterioration of Roxbury. After completing with another
indigeneous group, the Roxbury Community Council, Freedom
House-won official status as the neighborhood advisory body
to the BRA. 6 2
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Basically, from the BRA point of view, the Washington
Park renewal progressed without a lot of'friction. The
conducive social setting, and the fact that both lay and
technical staff were sensitive and well-informed meant that
63the redevelopment process, proceeded according to plans.
However, a crucial factor in this lack of major friction
was the fact that the one segment of the Roxbury community
which did oppose renewal was neither sufficiently represented
nor organized to present an effective dissent.64 It should
be remembered that the Washington Park project occurred
just before the activist phases of the Civil Rights
movement of the '60's. The discontent of the urban poor
with their exclusion from local decision -making had not yet
been vocalized, and the rationale of "maximum feasible
participation" which later afforded the poor a position at
the bargaining table, was not yet numbered among the neigh-
borhood forces with wh ich planning officials had to negotiate.
The preferences of the lowest income segment of Roxbury,
which Keyes labels "the black proletariat" endured the
renewal process largely silent and ignored.6 5
Still, Freedom House did not escape without critibism
from certain elements in Roxbury. Despite its promisses
that no BRA plans would be approved which were not in the
community's interests, Freedom House was accused of further-
66ing only bourgeois aspirations. Those grass-roots and civil
rights organizations which did exist alleged, that Freedom
House was trying to convert Washington Park into a sanctuary
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for the middle class. The fact that Freedom House's
efforts were largely financed by the BRA gave rise to
further accusations of collusion with officials downtown. 6 8
Though the BRA successfully completed its renewal
program.in Washington Park, with the overall blessing of the
delegated neighborhood body, the potential class conflicts
within the Roxbury community foreshadow battles which
occured in the subsequent Boston Model Cities program. The
fragmentation at the neighborhood level became acute once
poor black and Spanish-speaking people in Roxbury began to
voice their views as a group. Though the question of "what
constitutes participation?" was usually a rallying point
for community people seeking to negotiate with agency
officials, the question "who are the participants" is one
which became increasingly difficult to answer, as the
mandate for involvement broadened to include low-income
minority people.
2. OEO-CAP Programs
The federal notion of participation took a
dramatic turn with the enactment of the Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964. According to the language of this legislation:
the United States can achieve its full economic
and social potential only if every individual has the
opportunity to contribute to the full extent of
his capabilities, and to participate in the
workings of our society. 69
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A subsequent amendment to the Act called for:
... the development and implementation of all programs
and projects designed to serve the poor ... with
maximum feasible participation of residents of the
groups served. 70 (emphasis added)
The administrative guidelines issued by the Office of
Economic Opportunity (OEO) interpreted the maximum feasible
participation requirement to mean involvement of the poor
themselves in decision making, policy formulation, and
implementation of the program. Though there is some
evidence that the drafters of this legislative component
had no idea of the complex problems they were getting into,7 1
this federal support for participation by indigeneous citizens
cast OEO in a role different from the Urban Renewal Adminis-
tration. With the Community Action Programs established by
the 1964 Act, OEO became an advocate for the poor in their
struggle for access to local decision making process. By
circumventing city hall and giving money directly to local
non-profit anti-poverty groups, OEO exercised the principle
of "countervailing power." 72. The governing boards of
Community Action Agencies (CAA's) allotted one-third of
their membership to business, one-third to government, and
one-third to constituencies within their target area.
Eventually, 95% of the CAA's chose to operate, outside of
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local government control.
The tenor of the times had much to do with the inclusion
of "maximum feasible participation" in the Economic Opportunity
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Act. The Civil Rights movement was growing nationally, and
led by Martin Luther King, Jr., young aotivists were calling
for greater accountability to the principles of participatory
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democracy. With the Kennedy Administration came a shift
in emphasis on community involvement. Projects such as the
Ford Foundation's Grey Areas Program, the Juvenile Delinquency
Demonstration Programs under RFK, and the New York City
mobilization for youth focused attention on social change.
The bootstraps philosophy of the 60's entailed "helping
people to help themselves."75 Supposedly bulwarked by federal
support the poor were going to be able to demand their fair
share of services from recalcitrant city governments.
This view of the proficiency and local governments
in dealing with the needs and concerns of low-income people,
is in marked contrast to the pro-localist nature of revenue
sharing programs a decade later. Unlike GRS and SRS which
seek to restore the power of local governments, the OEO-CAP
rationale sought means outside the traditional political
system to represent a higherto ignored constituency, the
poor.
The participation of the poor in Community Action'
Programs was often a turbulent operation. Many municipal
power structures balked at the'notion of parti,cipation by
the target population of poverty programs. Conflicts ensued
between indigeneous anti-poverty organizations and established
local politicans.' Meanwhile the proponents of maximum
feasible participation back in Washington, were unprepared for
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struggle with entrenched local bureaucracies. 76
One theory attributes OEO's naiv6t ' with regard to its
position in the conflict at the local level, to a basically
"hygenic view of urban politics." Under this theory
OEO assumed that city hall would eventually accomodate the
poor, who would in turn reward that accomodation by voting
appropriately at the polls. What OEO did not initially
realize was that while succeptible to alliances with the
poor that might help them get more federal money, most
Mayors were wary if not hostile to any program, regardless
of funding, which hinted at a redistribution of power.78
It is not clear that any of the CAP organizations
succeeded in affecting a redistribution of power, though in
several instances individual projects came close. One of
the first of the National Demonstration Programs under the
Economic Opportunity Act, Operation Headstart, precipitated
a series of changes in'the local status quo in Mississippi.
Civil rights workers and low-income black people of 32
Mississippi counties, set up the Child Development Group
of Mississippi (CDGM) a complex of 128 Headstart Centers.
Not only were many poor black children educated for the first
time, but their parents and neighbors were recruited to manage
and develop the program. The salaries paid to these newly
trained administrators provided them an independent source
of income in the midst of a racist power structure which
previously had controlled their lives. Furthermore, this
new found economic independence led to independent decision
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making, and a degree of self-determination which profoundly
alarmed the Mississippi Congressional Ddlegation. 80 Sargent
Shriver, who at that time headed OEO, stepped in to bolster
the position of the CDGM against the outslaughts of local
politicians, the coalition between CDGM and OEO was moderately
successful and the organization survived but in significantly
alterred form.81
As the poverty programs wore on, and conflict at the
local level became more apparent, OEO relaxed its advocacy
role and stopped prodding mayors and politicians to co-
operate with CAA's. Gradually as those OEO officials who
had lobbied most vigorously for participation of the poor left
the national agency, local poverty programs fell under the
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control of established political organizations. Participa-
tion by the poor became an empty exercise.
The demise of the Mound Bayou Community Hospital and
Medical Center is vivid testimony to the casualties which
can result from the removal of federal support. This OEO
funded facility grew into a comprehensive medical center
which offered free treatment to indigents in four Mississippi
counties. It also gave jobs to over 500 people from the Mound
Bayou area. When OEO's funding to the hospital was cut off,
the Atlanta Regional Office of HEW made the decision to
terminate support, operating under the directives of the
83New Federalism. The comprehensive health program conducted
by the community hospital and health center was oriented
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toward prevention of disease, and erosion of the cycle
of poverty which trapped the rural poor.' Most of the
residents of Mound Bayou who received free treatment were
black people, who survived on less than $1,000 per year, and
had previously been refused when they had tried to enter
the regular county hospital.
In the beginning, in order to make the funding immune
to state vetoes, the grants earmarked for the health center
were channeled through institutions of higher education,
specifically Tufts University, and the University of New York
at Stony Brook. The merger of what had been two separate
health facilities changed this situation and the governor of
Mississippi was able to stop all program funding.84
At the same time that the. regional HEW terminated support
for the Mound Bayou hospital, it began consideration of a
$105,000 grant proposal from the South Delta Health Planning
Council to "seek reasonable means of improving health condi-
tions' in six Mississippi counties, including the four which
were previously served by the Mound Bayou center. As in
most states, patronage politics reign in Mississippi and it
so happens that members of the South Delta Council are ap-
pointed by the governor.
The essential lesson of the ephemeral successes of
the CAP program is the crucial role of the federal government
in advocating attention to the needs of low-income people.
The direct funding of community inspired programs, be they
I.
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educational, medical, manpower, or service oriented can
create a vital and usually unprecedented'power base for
politically and economically disadvantaged communities.
A federally funded project has the potential of providing a
source of independence and self-determination for low-income
and minority people who have previously been victimized by
racist local governments and private enterprise. The fact
that such people are no longer totally dependent on the local
power structure for employment and services gives them new
leverage for independent action.
It is this type of federal lever which is absent in
both general and special revenue sharing programs. The
former scepticism of local gov'ernments' amenability to the
demands of the poor, has been supplanted by renewed confi-
dence in the beneficence of local officials. The commit-
ment to localism in the New Federalism is not a commitment
to local people, as much as it is a commitment to local
bureaucrats and-a return to traditional decision-making
structures. The effect of such localism is to pull the rug
out from under many small indigeneous anti-poverty efforts
which cannot survive without the lever of federal support.
Civil rights organizer, Reverend Reems Barber conducted
a study of GRS expenditures from January to June--1973 in
22-counties and 54 cities and towns in Mississippi. In
what is one of the poorest states in the nation, he found
that only 0.3% of GRS money was spent on social services for
the poor and aged, 0.2% for economic development, 0.2%
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for community development, and 0.0007% (slightly more than
$100) for education.8 5
Another veteran of the civil rights movement in
Mississippi has analyzed the crucial role of federal financial
and political support by saying:
One of the strongest tools we had in the civil
rights movement in the South was federal money and
the jobs that went with it. It made black people
independent because control of their existence
was moved outside the racist power structure.
General Revenue Sharing means that in Mississippi
where black people are still not represented in
state and local government, federal programs that
provided the only means of economic and psychological
survival for a larger number of black people will
either die, or undergo complete reorganization. 86
3. Model Cities
As struggles between CAA's and local govern-
ments became more publicized .the national image of the
Community Action Program grew increasingly antagonistic,
especially to those entrenched officials who felt threatened
by the notion of empowered poor people. When the time came
for policy-makers at HUD to draft legislation for the Model
Cities program, the pressure was on to put the reigns of program
control back into the hands of local officials. In Sherry
Arnstein's words, "policy makers ... were determined to
return the genie of citizen power to the bottle from which
it had escaped..." 87
That being the case, Model Cities legislation was
1
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conceived which rejected the OEO philosophy of direct. fund-
ing of the poor. Instead, the governing body of Model
Cities programs was to share power, not only among its own
ranks, but with professionals, experts, and the delegated
ultimate authority, City Hall. The Demonstration Cities
and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 contained rather
cautious provisions for citizen participation, premised on
the assumption that local governments could still be used
as vehicles of reform for dealing with urban slums.89 The
eligibility requirements contained in Section 103 of the Act
include requirements that:
1. physical and social problems ... are such
that a comprehensive demonstration program is necessary
2. the program is of sufficient magnitude ... to
provide ... widespread citizen participation in the
program, maximum opportunities for employing
residents of the area in all phases of the program,
ane enlarged opportunities for work and training. 90
The oversight authority for the Model Cities program
rested with the Secretary of HUD who had responsibility for
providing technical assistance to city demonstration
agencies (CDA's) and for assisting such agencies in planning,
developing and administering comprehensive city demonstration
91
programs.
Unlike the specific target support method used by the
categorical grants, Model Cities sought a more comprehensive
approach to urban redevelopment. This desire to deal with
all phases of the city, frequently led program recipients
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astray, since comprehensiveness was interpreted by some
localities as meaning studying every possible factor which
might impact their cities.92 Also the fact that the funds
could be applied to such a wide variety of urban problems
often led to intense competition between neighborhood groups
vying to implement their proposals. 9 3
The reticence of the legislative citizen participation
requirement did not actually translate into vastly curtailed
citizen involvement, however. The same national.mood of
activism regarding the oppression of minority people, and
the crisis of the ghetto, which had influenced the adminis-
trators at OEO, pushed HUD programs to extend the pattern
of citizen participation beyond legislative intent. This
time around the situation was more urgent. The civil rights
movement had grown more militant, local neighborhood
consciousness had given rise to cries for "community control",
and by the late 60'sa series of urban riots had made clear
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the crisis situation of the cities.
In addition, 1967 saw a significant shift in personnel
from OEO to HUD, causing a radicalization of HUD temperament
towards more dynamic citizen involvement.9 5
Boston
The Boston Model Cities program,one of the first in the
country, is also one of the instances where actual citizen
involvement on the Model Neighborhood Board exceeded
conservative interpretations of the Act. Through a combination
113
of adept political maneuvering and fortuitous circumstance,
the Boston Model Neighborhood Board (BMNB) was able to
maintain final veto power over any project proposal. It
was this veto power which gave the BMNB its credibility,
and which broadened its efficacy beyond a simply advisory
role. 9 6
Comprised of 18 representatives from the Model Cities
area, the board was delegated the official task of develop-
ing representative community proposals, of working with
members of the Boston CDA to incorporate neighborhood priori-
ties in the operation of programs in the Model Cities area,
and to voice and be directly accountable to the considered
views and opinions of model neighborhood residents.97 In
reality the BMNB found little time to devote to its policy-
making functions. Staffed by working people whose only
financial renumeration was reimbursement for babysitting and
transportation, board 'members spent long hours pouring over
contracts and deciding whether or not to fund individual
proposals. There were 19 program areas, and the volume
and trivia involved in contract review frequently proved
98
overwhelming.
One reason that the -BMNB was initially able to retain
a relatively high degree of influence was its relationship
to both the mayor and the CDA. The original structure of
the board evolved out of a pre-planning hearing at which
the BRA was to present its plan for a Model Cities applica-
tion. A number of community leaders from the prospective
I.
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model neighborhood intervened and demanded that a model
neighborhood board be set up as an independent and discreet
entity complete with veto power. The BRA and city
authorities were sufficiently surprised, and the community
leaders were sufficiently well organized that the latter
. 99-
won their case.
The resulting board was created with the mandate to
deal with the model neighborhood as an urban laboratory, where
innovative strategies for job training, income redistribu-
tion, education, development, and other social services
would be tried and tested before implementation in other
depressed areas of the city.1 00  Insufficient funding,
community fragmentation and perhaps timidity on the part
of some members, caused the board to fall short of its goal. 1 01
Politics were a factor in the workings of the BMNB, but
equally as important were the personalities of major actors
in the program. The first head of the board was Dan Richardson,
a black leader known in the Roxbury community and one of the
key figures in the pre-planning hearing which sparked the
board's creation. As time went on, it became evident that
Richardson had difficulty dealing with the top CDA administra-
tor, Paul Parks, a black mayorial appointee. As the head of
the CDA, Parks was responsible for the overall administration
of Model Cities in Boston. His authority came directly
from city hall where the final decision-making power rested.
Yet the unique situation of the Boston Model Neighborhood
Board was such that Parks needed their consent for project
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funding or else their right of veto would be exercised.
The exact reasons for the animosity between Parks and Richard-
son can only be speculated. Differences in outlook, and
like capacities for political shrewdness meant that the two
competed for influence over the program and sanction of the
board.1 02
As time went on, Parks was able to demonstrate consid-
erable persuasiveness with both the BMNB and the mayor.
The independence of the board from the CDA lessened, not
because of a conscious decision to alter program structure,
but because the board members tended to concede willingly
to Parks' line of thinking. Richardson, however, did not
share this position, and after a series of incidents where
his displeasure was made explicit, Richardson was replaced
as head of the board. 10 3
Under Richardson's successors the BMNB lapsed into a
fairly impotent role. Parks' overriding influence continued,
the volume of paperwork increased, and board members were
kept too busy to contemplate either their wavering independence
from the CDA, or the policy implications of their internal
decision-making process. Though originally board members
kept in constant touch with neighborhood priorities, the
recycling of community opinion- was stifled bygintense
competition for 'slackening federal funds. One former member
of the BMNB remembers that the allocation procedure was some-
what akin to a federal pot of gold being plunked'down in the
middle of one neighborhood with instructions for everyone to
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"come and get it." 104
Boston's situation offers several lessons for the
participation of community people or decision-making bodies
for federal programs. When their potential input is real,
not advisory, board members must be allowed to devote
energies to important policy considerations. An appropriate
workload would have included such strategy determinations,
as well as some enforcement power over policy inplementation.
Contact with the community should have been formalized, in
order for it to be sustained. There should be structured
mechanisms for grievance, clear statements of the interests
which board members represent, and publicized guidelines
for neighborhood people who want to know how to plug into
the process. Such established procedures would have in-
sulated board members from informal bargaining with individuals
who wanted a pet project funded, and would have helped all
contract review participants function more efficiently.1 05
Philadelphia
While the case of the Boston Model Cities Program
demonstrates the progress and pitfalls of citizen participa-
tion on Model Neighborhood boards, the Philadelphia experience
highlights aspects of the interaction between, model neighbor-
hood residents ahd city hall. Coalition politics provided
neighborhood people and effective base from which to bargain
with city hall. The legislative requirement for citizen
participation contained in the Act allowed them to employ a
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legal strategy which ultimately affirmed their position in
a conflict with the CDA.
In 1967, citizens from different ethnic groups and
political identifications allied themselves and formed the
North City Area-Wide Council, Inc.,(AWC) in Philadelphia.
Their strength as a coalition of interests. made it possible
for them to intervene successfully in the beginning stages
of their city's Model Cities planning process. AWC did
leave an invaluable legacy in a suit which it initiated against
HUD North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v. Romney, 428 F.2d
754 (3rd Cir. 1970). The case came on appeal from a motion
to dismiss which had been granted to the defendants by the
District Court. At issue was compliance to requirements in
the Model Cities governing statute that to be eligible for
Federal aid, a comprehensive city demonstration program
must provide ... widespread citizen participation in the
program and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
must emphasize local initiative in the planning ... [of it]. 1 0 6
Model Cities, a predecessor of HCDA professed the basic phil-
osophy that improving the quality of life of the residents
of a model neighborhood could be accomplished only by the
affirmative action of the people themselves. This required
a means of building self-esteem, competence and a desire to
participate effectively in solving social and physical
problems of their community. The suit challenged the sufficiency
of citizen consultation and participation in the'planning and
carrying out of the program.
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By agreement between the city of Philadelphia and the
AWC, a large portion of the Model Cities' program was to
107be administered by seven non-profit corporations, and
AWC would provide the citizen participation needed by statute.
HUD objected to the arrangement and the city amended its
Model Cities application to cut AWC's role 'without the
coalitions' consultation. Central to the original purposes
of the Philadelphia plan had been providing Model Cities
residents with an opportunity to participate fully in city
decisions affecting the target area and "to assume some
control over their own economic resources.',108 HUD
unilaterally added further restriction on AWC's role. In
response, the coalition refused to renew its contract with
the city to fulfill the citizen participation component.
Philadelphia's plan was funded, and AWC sought to enjoin
the program in Federal District Court.
The Act placed an extremely high value on local initiative
in the planning, development, and implementation of local
programs, 42 USCA 93303(b)(l). City Demonstration Agency
letter No. 3, Oct. 30, 1967 as cited in the opinion states"
The implementation of this statutory provision
requires: (1) the constructive involvement
of citizens in the model neighborhood area and
the city as a whole in planning and carrying out
the program.. *** The city Government *** will be
responsible for insuring that whatever [local
citizen] organization is adopted provides the
means for the model neighborhood's citizens to
participate and be fully involved in policy;-making,
planning and the execution of all program elements. 109
4.
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The court emphasized citizen participation, negotiation
and consultation in the major decisions of the particular
110
Model Cities Program. A standard for citizen involvement
was enunciated.
While not every decision regarding a Program may
require full citizen participation, certainly
decisions which change the basic strategy of the
Program do require each participation.
The court concluded that the agreement had undergone funda-
mental changes and had contemplated a much heavier involvement
by the AWC as citizen participants. The heavy reduction of
involvement as found by the court "drastically reduced" the
intensity of citizen involvement. Such a basic change in
the strategy of the program required citizen input. The
Secretary was held to be in violation of the Act.
On remand, the District Court held that the city's
failure to consult with AWC on the issue of the coalition's
participation was proper. The citizens group had been afforded
access to program planning, and that the onus for terminating
the contract lay on AWC. For the full disposition of the
case on remand see 329 F.Supp. 1124 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
Area-wide Council, another case under the Model Cities
Act, Bouchard v. Washington, 356 F.Supp. 223 (D.C.D.C. 1.972)';
other suites, Powelton Civil Homeowner's Association v. HUD
284 F.Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968), brought under the Urban
Renewal Program; and Shannon v. Hurd, 305 F.Supp% 205
(E.D. Pa. 1969) rev'd 436 F.2d 809 (3rd Cir. 1970) (brought
41
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under the Housing Act of 1949) create a trend which define
the practical applications of citizen participation in major
federal programs which predecessors to HCDA.
Citizens will be allowed procedural participation in
the design, planning, strategy and implementation of community
development programs. Substantive decisions and the final
authority to approve, disapprove and implement plans remains
vested in governmental authorities. Citizens under these
programs are limited more to procedural due process-type
attacks on administrative practices which are often easily
remedied by an official merely listening to the aggrieved
party or parties in a series of formal situations prior to
. . .111
agency decisionmaking.
Time, access to money, and technical assistance are
also important elements of viable citizen participation.
The fact that the planning process is lengthy in any program
which includes community residents as well as experts; the
posibility of a time gap between the application for funds
and the moment that they arrive; the time spent staffing a
project and executing a plan, are all factors which make
inexperienced community input difficult. A clear understand-
ing should be reached at the outset by administrators and
laymen, that long-term planning involves few immediately
tangible rewards'. Expectations for workloads and deadlines
must be explicit, if people who are unaccustomed to working
with each other (local officials, experts and citizens)
are to cooperate and be productive.
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Money for operating costs is essential for long-term
involvement. Inclusion of people who are professionally
inexperienced means that costs rise, but this must be seen
as a necessary expense. One author has capsulized this
argument well by noting that "an efficiently made bad
decision is more expensive than an inefficiently made good
decision. "112
Delivery systems for federal programs are complicated
and in many cases, needlessly so. In order for citizens and
community groups to navigate effectively the bureaucracy,
trained managers, advisors and organizers should be made
available. The 1968 HUD Guide for citizen participation in
Model Cities placed a lot of emphasis on technical assistance.
This document recognized critical aspects of development
of community expertise. Foremost among these were the need
to establish trust between neighborhood residents and city
officials, financial-support for citizens who could not
otherwise become involved, and the importance of dividing
the planning workload, specified in the partnership between
residents and the city. 1 1 3
Unfortunately, the subsequent Nixon equivalent of'HUD's
Technical Assistance Bulletin No. 3, known as CDA letter no. 10A,
de-emphasized the need for technical aid and stressed
114
reliance on existing agencies and officials.
Undoubtedly the most important lesson offered by the
old OEO and HUD programs is the crucial role, of a decisive
federal mandate for citizen participation. Without this
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federal lever, citizen groups at the local level can offer
few ultimatums to non-complaint city governments.
C. Citizen Participation In General Revenue Sharing.
1. Legislative Requirements
The Office of Revenue Sharing's requirements for
citizen participation, or more accurately, for public account-
ability are very limited in scope. According to federal
regulations, each recipient government must:
1. (Planned Use Report ) - submit to the Secretary
a report, on a form to be provided, of the specific
amounts and purposes for which it plans to spend
the funds which it expects to receive for an
entitlement period. 115
2. (Actual Use Report) - submit to the Secretary
an annual report ... of the amounts and purposes
for which such funds have been spent or other-
wise transferred from the trust fund. 116
Before submission to 0,RS, both reports must be published
in one or more newspapers of general circulation within the
State. In addition each recipient government is required
to advise the news media including minority and bilingual
news media within its geographic area of the publication
of its reports. Copies of the reports are to be made avail-
able for public inspection at a specified location during
normal business hours.118
These Planned and Actual use reports are the only
federally required forms of public information on GRS.
GRS contains no specific language describing'one need for or
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substance of a real citizen involvement. Even as strictly
information dissemination regulations, the Planned and
Actual Use Reports are woefully inadequate.
A recent study done by the National Clearinghouse on
Revenue Sharing has found that. in a number of cities, the
reports were usually placed with the legal notices, often
in much reduced size, and in one city one Planned Use Report
was mixed in with the want ads.119 In an even greater
number of cities and states the reports barely got filed at
all. By September 1974, some 6,000 state and local govern-
ments faced delays of three months or more because they
hand't filed the proper forms. Overwhelmingly, the forms
which caused these governments the most problems were the
Planned and/or Actual Use Reports. 1 2 0
When the reports are made public their content may be of
dubious value, because expenditures are reported according
to broad functional categories, rather than by specific
progrAm or activity. ORS contends that because of its
"speculative and unbinding nature" it would be meaningless
to require government to pinpoint expenses on. their Planned
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Use Reports, As it stands, the information provided is
usually extremely vague. Planned and actual expenditures
are only divided into gross categories of "operating and
maintenance", and "capital" expenditures, with eight sub-
headings corresponding to the eight priority categories
122
mentioned in the Act, plus a few additional heads on the
capital side. Consequently, capital expenditures on land for
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TABLE IV
ACTUAL USE REPORT
Ganeral Revenue Sharing provides federal funds directly to local and state governments. Your government must publish this
report advising you how these funds have been used or obligated during the year from July 1. 1973. thru June 30. 1974.
This is to inform you of your government's priorities and to encourage your participation in decisions on how future funds
should be spent.
ACTUAL EXPENDITURES
0OPE RATING/CATEGORIES (A) CAPITAL (B) MAINTENANCE (C)
I PUBLIC SAFETY $
2 ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION $ 
. $
3 PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION $ $
4 HEALTH $ $
5 RECREATION $ $
e LIBRARIES $ $
7 SOCIAL SERVICES
FOR AGED OR POOR $ $
8 FINANCIAL
ADMINISTRATION $
9 MULTIPURPOSE AND
GENERAL GOVT. $
11 SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT
12 HOUSING& COM.
MUNITYDEVELOPMENT $
13 ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
14 OTHER(Specify) -
16 TOTALS S
NONDISCRIMINATION REOUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN MET
(E) CERTIFICATION: I certify that I em the Chief Executive Officer and.
with respect to the entitlement funds reported hereon, I certify that they
have niot been used in violation of either the priority corenditure
requirement iSection 1031 or the matching unds prohibition (Section
104)of the Act.
Signature of Chief Executive
Name and Title
Date
THE GOVERNMENT OF
has received General Revenue Sharing payments totaling
during the period from July 1. 1973. thru June 30. 1974.
ACCOUNT NO.
D) TRUST FUND REPORT
(1) Balanceas ofJune30.1973..........$
(2) Revenue Sharing Funds Received from
July 1. 1973 through June 30. 1974..$
(3) Interest Earned...... .. ...... _$
(4) Total Funds Aveilable ............... $_
(5) Total Amount Expended.............$
(8) Balance es of June 30. 1974...........$
(F) The news media have been advised that a complete copy of this
report has been published in a local newspaper of general
circulation, I have records documenting the contents of this report
and they are open for public scrutiny at
y IMPORTANT: THE UPPER HALF OF. THIS PAGE MUST BE PUBLISHED (SEE INSTRUCTION H)
It is not required that the lower half of this form be published.
(G) Hs the availability of Revenue Sharing funds enabled your government to.
Prevent now taxes
Reduce taxes
E] Prevent Increased taxes
Maintain current tax levels
Prevent now debts
Reduce old debts
(Check as many as apply.)
THiS REPORT MUST BE RECEIVED
BEFORE SEPTEMBER 1, 1974 BY:
OFFICE OF REVENUE SHARING
1900 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE. N.W.
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20226
ORS FORM NO. 3231 MAR 1974
IH)-PUBLICATION (refer to instruction H)
The upper part of this report was published in the following
newspaper on the stated date
t a cost of
Name of Newspaper
Date Published
DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE
FOR REVENUE SIARING USE ONLY7TRw9w.1mT112 Tb'm174lT17
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"recreation" encompasses both preserving a wilderness area,
as was reported in Phoenix, as well as a tevenue-producing
golf course, as was the case in St. Louis County.1 23
The publication requirement for the reports makes three
disputable assumptions; first, that average citizens can
make enlightened judgments on budget decisions,'solely on
the basis of a form which describes only a fraction of the
total available; second, that in the absence of formal
regulations for submission of the reports to a legislative
body for prior approval, that Planned use reports embody
substantive thinking and serious commitment; and third, that
in the small amount of time alloted between publication of the
reports and their submission toi the federal authorities, that
citizens can comment and act upon any disputes they have
124
with the published budgetary intentions.
In the majority of localities, media coverage of GRS
decision-making processes has been sporadic, probably be-
cause most media representatives don't really understand
125the program. Radio and television broadcasters especially
argue either that budgetary matters aren't suitably compelling
material, or that most people really aren't interested'in the
126budget. General budget information is no easier to come
by. Only a few cities such as Richmond, Seattle/ and Denver
put out explanatory budget booklets. There are a small
number of cities which use program type, budgets which are
easier to decipher than the standard line-item type. However,
more often than not general budgets are comprehensible only
126-
to trained budget officials, who show few signs of opening
up their private domain to ordinary laypeople.'2 7
The result of vague and spotty GRS information is to
make it extremely difficult for even the most committed
interest groups to document the impact of funds in their
areas. In poor and minority communities where residents
have even more to lose by improper handling of funds, the
dearth of information on spending decisions means that most
people are unaware of expenditure patterns which .affect
them, and therefore unprepared to mobilize on their own
behalf.
2. GRS and the Budget
The method by which GRS funds interact with
local budget processes also makes a difference in the public
accountability of the money. The requirement that recipient
governments establish a trust fund to finance the program,
in effect allows Congress to forego the usual checks on local
government decision making associated with its annual
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appropriation process. This minimization of the over-
sight role of either Congress or the Executive is cons-istent
with the decentralized philosophy of the program. Other
potential checks such as voter approval of tax measures and
bond issues, do not function because GRS funds reach the
local. level automatically. Nor are local elections an
effective check, because GRS money need not be raised locally,
and usually constitutes no more than seven to eight per cent
127
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of local city budgets.
Apparently some Congressional suppqrters placed great
faith in the abilities of their constituents to navigate
all these impediments and exercise oversight. Senators
Long of Louisiana and Bennett of Utah expressed this
view for the record:
Senator Long: "...the people of each community will
be far better policemen on the expenditure of their
money than any committee of Congress would be."
Senator Bennett: "I agree ... we have built into this
bill an effective, if unusual, method of controlling
the actual expenditure of these funds at the local
level."
Senator Long: "We will rely ... heavily on the fact
that (state and local governments) will inform their
own as to how they will -use the money, both before and
after it is spent." 130
The foregoing examples of the paucity of locally dissemin-
ated information about GRS, show just how unsubstantiated
Congressional faith has been.
The Brookings study found a strong connection between
citizen involvement in spending decisions, and the degree
to which GRS funds were nmerged or treated separately from
standard budgetary processes. In a survey of sixty-three
recipient governments, the Brookings analysts found that
citizen participation was greatest when GRS money was handled
separately, and least, when merged into the governments Gen-
eral Fund.131 Where procedures for handing GRS money were
neither entirely apart from nor part of normal budgetary
process, either special operations were set up in conjunction
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with regular ongoing procedures, a supplemental a-proach
was used in the early months of the program.132
Seven of the 63 cities reported on used a separate
process for GRS funds. The reasons offered by local officials
for treating funds in this manner was to give GRS money
greater visibility in the community and to encourage citizen
133
and interest group activities. In Los Angeles County,
for example, the Chief Administrative Officer said that the
city was sensitive to the fact that the GRS program may not
continue indefinitely and therefore felt that widespread
publication about the uses of GRS funds would enhance the
possibility of continuance of the program.134 As a result
of special public hearings on. GRS, separate budget documents
explaining expenditures, and good local media coverage
the community was kept informed of GRS goings-on, and
expressed their feelings through the city's Congressional
delegation.1 3 5
In Phoenix too, separate consideration of GRS funds
led to more citizen involvement than would otherwise have
been the case. In this city, prominent interest groups
participated throughout the process of allocating GRS -funds.
The staff of the city's budget office prepared long lists
of possible expenditure items for public review. .The normal
procedure would have been to solicit budgetary requests
from only the various municipal department heads. 1 3 6
Where special budgetary processes were instituted, in
conjunction with the regular budget cycle, the Brookings
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study found that the percentage of GRS money devoted to new
spending was affected. In the first group where the special
procedures were set up to increase public participation in
decision making, either through advisory committees or
hearings, the amount of money devoted to new spending was
high, totalling about 57% of shared revenue. In the second
group, where special procedures worked, in the opposite
direction, that is, to by-pass regular processes which would
have called for either public or departmental input, ex-
penditures for new uses were much lower, equalling 9.7%
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of the groups shared revenue.
Although separate accounts may have been maintained
for GRS funds, most jurisdictions (36 out of 63) did not
treat the money separately from other revenues in their
budgetary process.138 In places like New York City, and
New York state, where GRS monies became indistinguishable
from the General Fund, even supporters of the program
couldn't show the effects of expenditures, much less public
interest groups trying to press for spending changes. 1 3 9
Members of the Pasadena Urban Coalition reported that merged
processes were almost impossible to monitor. After be'ing
deposited in a locality's General Fund GRS is trackless
because as they put it, "... all money is green.',1 4 0
3. Citizen Intervention in GRS
Some community groups around the country are
becoming increasingly adept at organizing to demand decision
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making roles in the GRS program expenditures. In DenVer,
citizens pushed Mayor McNichols to create a Citizens Advisory
Process, to aid in defining revenue sharing priorities and to
examine dollar requests for social program spending.
Responding to Nixon's cutbacks in social program allocations,
many people who had previously supported the chief executive's
plan to spend $21 million on capital improvements changed
their minds and voiced preferences for social spending.
A group of welfare mothers in Mobile, Alabama organized
a meeting of community groups, the press, and members of the
mayor's staff to question the chief official's revenue sharing
priorities. They challenged Mobile's plan to spend six
times as much of its $12 million in GRSjmoney, in white neigh-
borhoods as in the inner-city poor and black communities. The
welfare group has since approached NAACP lawyers about the
feasibility of filing an antidiscrimination suit.1 4 2
This type of legal action follows classic equal
protection analysis. Such suits often depend on a line of
argument alleging discrimination in the provision of municipal
services because of race and poverty. The hallmark case in
this area is Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 303 F.Supp. 1162 (N.D.
Miss. 1969) rev'd. 437 F.2d 1286 (5th C.A. 1971). The trial
court was reluctant to find the necessary racial-discrimina-
tion in order to warrant the injunctive relief sought by
plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Instead the trial court
relied on a rational basis test and found th.e municipal
actions rested on "rational considerations, irrespective of
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race of poverty ... not within the condemnation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and ... not proper,1y condemned upon
. .. .143judicial review.:
On appeal, it was held that the trial court erred in
applying the traditional equal .protection standard, "Where
racial classifications are involved, the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment command
a more stringent standard in reviewing discretionary acts of
state or local officers. ,144 No compelling state interests
were found in the record for ascertained disparities between
black and white areas of town. The appellate court ordered
the Town of Shaw to submit a plan for the court's approval
detailing how it proposed to cure the results of the pattern
145
of discrimination revealed in the record.
Community coalitions and individuals have brought
numerable actions alleging violations of revenue sharing
regulations based on ,discrimination, unequal services, and
lack of proper citizen input. The coercive character of
these actions has often caused local administrators to be
more responsive. Thirty-four human service programs in
San Diego formed an organization known as the Community
Congress. A press conference held by this group documented
the needs of their programs and substantiated the need for
an open hearing on the allotment of revenue sharing funds.
As a result of the subsequent hearing which included represent-
atives from community groups all over the city, a task force
was formed which eventually recommended that about one and a
132
half million dollars be set aside for human services.
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programs.
In San Francisco, Mayor Alioto first proposed to
allocate over $5 million of that city's GRS monies for a
massive-cultural arts center. A large number of local
citizens supported the heads of existing centers in their
fight to keep from closing because of lack of funds. On
the grounds that financing existing centers would be less
costly than creating a new "white elephant center", this
group of citizens called for new hearings on the planned uses
of GRS funds. Sucuumbing to public pressure, the Mayor
instructed the City Council to release $250,000 to assist
neighborhood based cultural centers, and abandoned his
original expenditure plans.1 47
The local NAACP in Fostoria, Ohio, requested that the
city use about $40,000 of its GRS money to help rescue a
Neighborhood Youth Corps Program, and secured a commitment
from a regional community action commission to assist in
administering the program. Fostoria's mayor used the in-
volvement of the community action agency as the basis for
denying funds for the program, on the grounds that prohi-
bitions in the Revenue Sharing Act made it illegal for a
municipality to donate GRS funds to any organization out-
side its boundaries. The citizen's counter argument was
that the agency would be receiving a payment for services
rendered, rather than a donation. After much petsistence,
the citizens managed to take the issue to Washington, D.C.,
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where ORS officials confirmed that it was not illegal to use
the funds in the proposed manner.148
These case histories are examples not only of the
potential efficacy of coalition politics and public moni-
toring actions, but also the potential use of revenue
sharing as a point of intervention into the municipal
budgeting process. By educating themselves about the way
in which their local governments have structured decision
making on GRS spending, citizens can learn about general
fiscal allotments and subject the budget process to rigid
dcrutiny. Communities which are aware of their cities
fiscal procedures can make contributions in their own
best interests, and can help ,to make that process more open
and accountable to overall public welfare.
In order to impact their local budgeting process,
community groups should know the key actors in the decisions
about revenues and exienditures, and the major components
of the budget. Budget formulation is usually the task of
the city manager, who then submits the document for approval
by the mayor. The individual budgets given to the city
manager by the various Department Heads form the basis of
the annual city budget. The Finance Director is responsible
for administration of the budget, and for the investment of'
the city's reserves and fund surpluses. The City Auditor
monitors the management of municipal expenditures and accounts,
and the City Clerk keeps records of the city's ordinances,
.al 1 4 9
proceedings and general business.
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Administrators and legislators who prepare, review,
and enact the budget take into account the numerous
demands upon public funds and determine the balance among
various program activities. The relative importance
of the various social, political, and economic forces at
work in the community are reflected in these budget decisions,
and policy is ultimately translated into dollars and cents. 1 5 0
There are usually two types of budgets at the state and
local level: operating, and capital. Capital expenditures
are money spent for acquisition of land, for building machinery,
furniture, and other equipment. All other expenditures such
as maintenance costs and staff salaries are operating
expenses. Normally, the capi.tal budget covers five or six
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years, and the operating budget is prepared annually.
The effects of these two types of expenditures on the
budget are different. Operating expenditures become relatively
fixed commitments whidh are usually held stable year after
year. Capital expenditures fluctuate with government
priorities, increasing when a major construction project is
undertaken, and diminishing when other items in the budget
take precedence.152 These two types of budgets are
interrelated, however. Future operating budgets are affected
by capital projects because ne.w facilities require maintenance
and staff. Likewise, capital expenditures influence the
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amount of money available for operating expenses.
The actual budget is made up of a number of'funds.
Some of these funds offer strategic points for consideration
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of concerned citizens. The General Fund is the large-st
single budget component, and is supplied mostly by revenues
from property and sales taxes, and a number of other
fees. Departmental expenditures form the bulk of General
Fund allocations. Citizens should be aware of the implica-
tions of tax increases and tax relief, and the effects of
departmental budget requests. 1 5 4
Money which comes to the city with no strings attached
may be put into special reserve funds, to await decisions by
officials as to type and level of use. Community groups
should question the earmarking of GRS and all other surpluses,
1 55in order to make sure that their allotment is equitable.1
Public enterprise funds are made up of profits from
businesses operated by local governments. Often, public
enterprises are allowed to function with minimal fiscal
control by the city. Local people who are concerned about
the shortage of city revenues should suggest the expansion
of local government's public enterprise to include more
profitable activities, despite opposition from the private
sector.1 5 6
Community groups should also pay attention to their
chief executive's Discretionary Fund, and the interests
which benefit most from its use. Pensions or retirement
funds which are invested by the administrative board are
also important. Citizens can urge that such funds be used
for socially oriented investment, such as govern1ient backed
loans for low and moderate income housing. Community groups
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can also explore and suggest new sources of revenue, an
intervention which might be positively received by city
governments 157
Once prepared, the budget document is sent to the
legislative body which reviews and revises it. It is at
this time that public hearings are usually. held. When
approved, the budget is sent to the chief executive who
has the power to veto all or any part of it. In most cases
this veto can be overriden by at least a majority of the
Legislature.1 5 8
Though it is important that citizen interest groups
exercise their option to attend public budget hearings, the
experience with GRS thus far ,is that these assemblies may be
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of limited value for community input. Occurring when
they do, at the end of the budget-making cycle, attendants
at hearings usually find that important decisions have been
made. Advance notice of meetings may be minimal, there
may be no opportunity provided for citizens to study the
budget in advance, and as little as half an hour may be set
aside for all citiezens to speak.160 Some citizens who have
tried without success to intervene via budget hearings,
complain that such occasions really just give citizens a
chance to yell. Others who are more sophisticated agree
that hearings are merely a safety valve, not nearly as
effective as talking to the right people on the inside.1 6 1
In most jurisdictions, city officials were ambivalent
about the need for special GRS hearings, because to them
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poor attendance at regular budget hearings indicate apathy.
Compounded by the conviction that most budget matters were
too complicated for lay people to understand, this attitude
led the majority of localities to hold special GRS hear-
ings only under pressure, or simply because the first GRS
checks came too late to be included under regular budget
procedures. 162
More general tactics for citizen involvement in the
budgetary process were defined by David Caputo in his study
of municipal interest groups in four New England cities.
Two overall patterns of participation emerged in Caputo's
research. The first was thorough and sustained intervention
early in the budget procedure,, while the outcomes of decisions
are still tentative. The second pattern occurred when
municipal interest groups acted in response to a decision,
which was at the point of being reviewed for council approval.
If requests made by th'e group for program funding had been
refused by the mayor, of if the council had excessively
reduced the mayor's allocation, the municipal interest
group fought to have the monies increased.1 63
Caputo observed that the most effective strategy for
community groups was direct intervention, rather than via a
third party advocate. The earLier in the budgetary process'
that contact occurred, the better the opportunity for citizens
to understand the implications of the policy being considered,
and the more amenable policy makers were to modifications.
The disadvantage of early intervention was the amount of
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money and other resources needed to sustain long-term public
commitment. There was also the danger that the group
would become tied to an intractable political stance. Early
intervention in some cases made it more difficult to form
coalitions with other interest groups.164
The strategy of direct but late intervention alleviated
the need for commitment to one public position, and allowed
the group to adapt its views to assume a better bargaining
position. However, late contact with policy-makers sometimes
proved "too late," and some valuable information which could
have been gained from a longer association was lost.165 Co-
alitions of citizens who represented significant electoral
strength in the community, or, those who were able to develop
a great deal of public support quickly were most successful
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in using the late intervention strategy.
In addition to avenues for citizen involvement which can
be discerned in the oVerall formulation and administration of
city budgets, there are a number of possible actions for
community groups which relate to specific GRS regulations.
The equitability of the state allocation formula, for example,
is subject to debate, and can be modified through legisla-
tion after one and a half years of program operation.167 The
allocation formula depends on the Census Bureau for popula-
tion and per capita income statistics, and starting with 1972.
a special section on the federal income tax return was used
to tabulate population for GRS purposes.168 This latter
method 'of counting omits most of the urban poor, since very
139
low-income people generally do not file income tax returns.
Well organized and vocal citizens groups have been
effective in stimulating neighborhood awareness of revenue
sharing issues, and in getting ordinances enacted which
foster responsive local government. Community organizations
which have worked to understand the complicated issues
surrounding GRS, can assume a pedagogical role and translate
the complex regulations and ramifications of the New Federalism
to other area citizens.
The formulation of a counter-budget is another tactic
which community groups can use in order to explain grass-
roots proposals in a clear and consistent form.1 69 Organized
citizens can even suggest the, revision of the city charter
in order to make budget procedures more open to public
inspection, and to redesign budget documents for wider
public understanding.170 Intergroup cooperation in these
efforts is vital. A niajor threat to organized local control
has been the competition between many scattered grassroots
factions, each fighting for a piece of the pie.
The inordinate burden which GRS places on local citizens
to monitor funds means that, to a much greater degree.than
in categorical grant programs, the initiative for action
must come from the community., Citizens do have some chance'
of organizing effectively around GRS, in places where the
funds.are relatively separate and identifiable. In such
cases citizens must do research on the planned and actual uses
of funds, become educated on the workings of the municipal
I
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budget, and at the same time keep abreast of indigeneous
priorities so that they can channel attention to local
needs. This awesome task must be performed without
official technical assistance from the federal government.
Such aid is barely available for the local administrators
who actually run the program. Moreover there is nothing in
the legislation itself to reward local officials who open
up their processes.
It is easy to understand why citizen involvement in
GRS has been minimal, despite the absence of Congressional
prohibition. This program is vivid testimony to the fact
that legislators can do a lot to thwart participation by
actually doing very little.
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D. Citizen Participation in Community Development
Revenue Sharing -- The Housing and Community
Development Act.
1. Legislative regulations.
The Housing and Community Development Act
does include a statutory requirement of citizen participa-
tion, but it is neither clear nor far-reaching enough to
provide strong leverage for community groups. In order to
receive a community development grant under this Act, the
applicant must provide satisfactory assurances that prior
to submission of its application it has:
(a) provided citizens with adequate information
concerning the amount of funds available for proposed
community development and housing activities which
may be undertaken....
(b) held public hearings to obtain views of (citizens)
of citizens on community development and housing needs
(c) provided citizens an adequate opportunity to
participate in the development of the application;
but no part of this paragraph shall be construed to
estrict the responsibility and authority of the
applicant for the development of the application
and the execution of the Community Development
Program. 180 (emphasis added)
The language of this legislation holds a number of
predictions for the intensity of citizen involvement in
HCDA. Clauses (A) and (B) which describe requirements
for information dissemination and the provision of a public
hearing, appear to prescribe an advisory role for citizens.
Even the third clause which ensures "adequate opportunity
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to participate in the development of the application,"
leaves unclear the extent of citizen input, and whether or
not that input is restricted to advice-giving and consulta-
tion.
Also unresolved is the issue of whether or not
community people will participate in the execution of the
program once the grant is received, and if so, just what
level of decision-making they can expect.
At least three speculations can be made about citizen
participation, based on the legislation. Some level of
involvement will exist, since the requirement is written
into the law. Citizens have the explicit right to informa-
tion about the programs, to attendance at public hearings and
to some form of participation in the application process. A
second speculation that can be made is that since none of
these regulations is particularly extensive, the burden for
initiating action rest's with the community, and not the
local power structure.
A third supposition can be drawn from clause (C) in
this section. The provision after the semi-colon in this
clause states that the applicants "responsibility and authority
for application development and program execution are not to
be restricted by citizen participation." This statement
seems to make certain that community input does not get in
the way of established decision-making processes, and marks
the upward ceiling of citizen activity. Thus itlappears
safe to assume that citizen participation in HCDA will
vary somewhere within the range of "informing" and "placation"
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(rungs three and five on Arnsteins ladder), but will -never
extend as far as actual decision-making. The discretion for
extent of participation will rest with local governmental
authorities.
Community Development Revenue Sharing does differ from
General Revenue Sharing in its degree of public accountability.
The HCDA distribution formula accounts more heavily for need
when determining the size of allocations. Metropolitan
population, extent of poverty, and the extent of.housing over-
crowding are major factors in the distribution formula.1 8 1
The HCDA regulations require the administering agency
to approve spending plans on the basis of the application,1 8 2
and to monitor the performance of jurisdictions to see if
they have carried out the program described in the applica-
tion, and whether the program conformed to the stipulations
of Title I of the Act.1 8 3
Also the kinds of services and activities eligible
under Community Development Revenue Sharing are more explicit,
than those under GRS.1 8 4
The specific reference to citizen input into the applica-
tion process signals the importance of the .pre-expenditure
phase of HCDA. As part of the application for funds, a
three-year community development plan must besubmitted which
demonstrates both short-term and long-term strategies and
objectives, which have been developed in accordance with
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area-wide planning and urban growth needs. This
community development plan has served as a point of departure
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for most local interest groups who want to secure a portion
of HCDA funding. By contributing to their local community
development plan, citizen groups are able to make known
their perceptions of local needs, and in instances where
more than one group is voicing claims on funds, put in a
bid to be the chief implementor of the local program once
funds arrive.
During the course of this chapter the nature of citizen
involvement in the application process and formulation of
a community development plan will be described in three
settings; at the big city level, in the process which took
place in Boston, at the small city level, in Newton's
application procedure, and at, the neighborhood level in a
description of Roxbury's part in Boston's application
for funds.
2. Boston -'- Application for HCDA funds in a
major urban center.
(a) Background
In order to understand the city of
Boston's reaction to HCDA, it is important to recognize the
trend toward neighborhood revitalization and governmental de-
centralization which has pervaded since the late 60's.
The emphasis on neighborhood improvements and pipelines to
the community is evidenced in the establishment of the
Little.City Hall program in 1968, and two years later in
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the expansion of BRA services to include a staff of district
planners. Each of these professionals is assigned 'to a
specific neighborhood and given the task of directing citizen
input into planning recommendations and decisions.1 8 6
A major capital improvements program was launched in
1968, which would re-concentrate activity from downtown to
the neighborhoods. Previously, from 1960 to 1967 some
$77 million was spent on capital improvements in Boston,
about half of which went to downtown and Urban Renewal
areas.187 From 1968 to 1975, $500 million has been spent
on neighborhood capital improvements, nearly six times the
. 188
amount of previous years.
During that same interval, functions of the Little
City Hall broadened, and by 1974 the city-wide program had
handled more than 130,000 requests for service or informa-
tion from the residents of Boston.189 Mayor White had
first introduced the Little City Hall concept during his
1967 campaign, as a way to mitigate the citizen's sense of
powerlessness, and resentment toward city government and
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elected officials. White set up the system of neighbor-
hood offices "to audit human problems at their source," and
to provide a cable of communication between city hall and
the people. 9 The primary responsibility for facilitating
citizen participation lies with the Little City Hall managers,
who would work to earn the confidence of the community and
its leaders in order to assess neighborhood sentiment.1 9 2
A.
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As will be discussed in the discription of Roxbury's process
later in this chapter, the manager can Also be caught in the
tenuous position of having to answer to two constituencies,
the mayor who made the appointment, and the community to
which he or she is assigned.
In part this mayorial emphasis on neighborhood
renaissance was a calculated reaction to political circum-
stance. Though citizen participation had been a high priority
during the 1967 campaign, to some extent this advocacy
position centered on the aspirations of organized racial
minority groups in Boston, and ways in which their voice and
consequently their political support could be strengthened.1 9 3
However, after White lost to 'the incumbent in the gubernatorial
election in 1970 his political focus shifted. After perceiv-
ing that concentration on national issues and the plight
of urban minorities had not bolstered his local image,
White cooled his former advocacy and turned attention to
white-ethnic voting blocks in other city neighborhoods.1 9 4
Thus it was with measured enthusiasm that White
welcomed the prospect of HCDA funds which could be tailored
to local demands without the restrictions of "project 'areas,"
or "model neighborhoods." HCDA funds give White the opportunity
to cover his political flanks in low-income areas like East
Boston, which adamantly opposed participation in prior Urban
Renewal or Model Cities programs. To these neighborhoods,
CDRS is acceptable because it carries with it no threat of
the federal bulldozer or loss of local autonomy. White
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rationalizes this viewpoint by explaining that categorical
grants which were targeted to specific xxeighborhoods gave
excluded areas a jaundiced view of the program. In his
words, "[Boston] cannot turn its back on one neighborhood
to rebuild another."1 9 5
In a very real sense Boston's HCDA money will be
coming-into a federal funding vacuum. Both the Urban Renewal
and Model Cities are. winding down, and the amount of
federal dollars flowing into the city is drastically reduced.
Previously Boston had averaged $45 million a year under
federal programs, and in 1972 alone the city had received
196$90 million. The maximum amount for which Boston could
apply under CDRS is $30.3 million for 1975 and that figure
declines sharply over the next six years:
1975 - $30.3 million
1976 - 28.7 million
1977 - 27.2 million
1978 - 20.2 million
1979 - 15.8 million
1980 - 11.9 million197
After six years of operation, during which time $,40
million was funneled to Roxbury, Dorchester, and Jamaica
Plain, the Model Cities program is being phased out.
1 9 8
Though funding ends officially in July, 1975 support must
be found to continue Model Cities services.
Boston also faces a shortfall of at least $89 million
for unrdet Urban Renewal commitments, an unusually high amount
I.
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relative to other cities. The city has applied for
discretionary funds under HCDA,200 in order to cover this
deficit, but if not granted, Urban Renewal commitments will
be competing with other neighborhood needs.2 0 1
This diminished Urban Renewal activity along with the
channeling of funds through City Hall rather than an LPA,
also has an impact on the role of the BRA. The current
function of the BRA under CDRS is a long way from the early
60's when Ed Logue ran the Authority as a powerful separate
entity, answerable to no one. Under Title I Urban Renewal
the BRA once received anywhere from $40 to $90 million
annually, but the CDRS block grant will go directly to the
city.202 Now the BRA is much more dependent on the mayor,
and is no longer able to rely on HUD for funds. The thirteen
uncompleted renewal projects are still the Authority's
responsibility, but once finished the need for the BRA is
lessened. One anonymous BRA official summed up the
situation:
The day of the big, bad, BRA is gone ... It's
not so big, and it's definitely not bad. 203
(b) The Application Process.
The task of drafting and signing
Boston's community development plans for HCDA funds, by
law belongs to the Mayor, who must allow for some degree
of citizen input. Once drafted, the plans must be approved
by the.Boston City Council. The application'is then filed
with and reviewed by tte State's Department of Communities
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and Development, before the city's final submission to
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HUD in Washington, D.C. White's plant met resistance at
two points in the application process, one more serious than
the other. Several neighborhoods were disgruntled by what
they perceived as inadequate community involvement, and
the Boston City Council refused to pass the plan without
major alterations.
Considering the neighborhood reaction first, local dis-
content with the situation centered on both the process and
the plan itself. In order to determine neighborhood
priorities, White set up a Neighborhood Development Council
(NDC) consisting of six key city officials chaired by the
Deputy Mayor.205 The NDC met' first with) Little City Hall
managers and staff, and with BRA district planners in order
to assemble factual information for distribution to the
neighborhoods. 206
The NDC then scheduled 18 individual meetings in each
of the city's major neighborhoods, as a vehicle for citizen
participation. The meetings were chaired by the heads
of the Little City Halls, and were designed to introduce the
CDRS program, structure local input, and provide neighbor-
hood feedback for the NDC.2 0 7
Interest groups in several neighborhoods objected to
the Little City Halls' control of the meetings, feeling that
the only purpose served by such a structure were those of
208*
the mayor who wanted his proposals ratified. , Other neigh-
borhood people argued that they weren't given enough time to
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digest the Mayor's plan and as a result could not
209
organize their grievances effectively. 2
Once the Little City Halls had completed their meetings
neighborhood sentiments were mixed. Residents of the Fair-
mount housing project in Hyde .Park said that they were happy
that their request for outdoor lighting would be answered.
Mattapan townspeople protested that the Little City Hall
staff talked them out of their top priorities, saying
that their agenda was too ambitious. 21 0
City-wide, the Mayor's proposal was greeted with
"cheers and jeers" when presented on January 29.211 Some
citizens felt that the money should have been evenly divided
between all the 18 neighborhoods. The Roxbury area was
pleased to learn that the Mission Hill public housing project
was slated to receive $2.8 million for renovations. 212 Other
white ethnic neighborhoods, such as South Boston, were angry
over the appropriations to Model Cities (a close-out budget),
the Sputh End, and, of course, to Roxbury.213
Fortunately for South Boston and unfortunately for Rox-
bury, the City Council was stacked in favor of low-income white
interests. It was during the Council authorization pr'ocedure
that the Mayor's plans underwent major surgery. The central
figure in the controversy was Louise Day Hicks, unsuccessful
opponent of the Mayor in the '67 election, and outspoken
advocate of the rights of white working class neighborhoods.
The two-week debate in the Council's Ways and Means
Committee revolved around two main issues, the Home Improve-
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ment Program, and the allocation to the Mission Hill project.
For obvious reasons the Hicks contingent adamantly opposed
funding of the predominately black Mission Hill housing, even-
though it is known area-wide as the most devastated property
under BRA control. The Council slashed the allocation to
Mission Hill in half, and redistributed the money among
three predominately white public housing projects in
South Boston, East Boston, and Roslindale. 2 1 4
The Council did not feel that enough money had been
set aside for the Home Improvement Program. Designed
primarily for low and moderate income small property owners,
this program provides a cash grant equivalent to 20% of
rehabilitation costs.215 Hicks took almost $1 million from
the $4.2 million alloted to complete Urban Renewal projects
and redirected the money to the rehabilitation program.216
The Council also adopted an amendment to prohibit any part
of the CDRS money from being used for demolition, site
clearance, or construction, in the $266 Park Plaza Urban
Renewal project. 2 1 7
In order to further demonstrate their distaste with the
Mayor's priorities, the Council voted to remove the names
of all city and county officers from the program application,
"so that it couldn't be called 'The Mayor's Program' for
housing or improVements."218 This last swipe at White proved
a bit-exhuberant, and the proposal later had to go back to
the Council for corrections. Hicks' vehemence nbthwithstanding,
the law requires that federal assurance must be given that
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the municipality's chief executive officer is designated
as the authorized representative to act in connection with
219
the application. The application was finally sent to
HUD in mid April.2 2 0
3. Newton
HCDA funds are expected to arrive in Boston
in late June, 1975. The time since the completion of the
application process has been spent devising implementation
schemes, and monitoring further feedback from neighborhoods.
In order to get some idea of what the dynamics of CDRS are
at the neighborhood level. I spent several months from
January until June as an observer at community meetings in
Roxbury, organized around the expectation of HCDA funds.
I also observed meetings and talked with officials in nearby
Newton, Mass., as a way of getting some basis of comparison
for the proceedings irn Boston and Roxbury. Newton is a
less complicated illustration of how citizens can be involved
in the application for HCDA funds. Though the city is made
up of distinct neighborhoods each with its own viewpoint,
the rivalries between these neighborhoods are not as intense
or as antagonistic as those for example between Roxbury
and South Boston. Racial strife is not really an issue in
Newton, since minority groups comprise well under 5% of
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the total population.
Newton's population in 1970 was recorded at-$91,623.2 2 2
As might be expected in a medium-sized city, connections between
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townspeople and their government are relatively close'so
the alienation of constituencies which plagues Boston's
city administration is not a great problem in.Newton. A
1972 city-wide survey of Newton community needs revealed
that only slightly more than 10% of the respondents felt
that there was a lack of opportunity to participate in city
affairs. Seventy-six per cent of the respondents thought
that taxes were by far the most serious issue citizens faced. 2
2 3
The median income for families in Newton in -1970 was
15,381, a figure higher than that for the metropolitan region
as a whole.224 However, contrary to commonly held notions,
Newton is not an entirely middle and upper middle-class
community. The Housing and Cbmmunity Development Act
defines moderate income households as those with incomes
less than 80% of the metropolitan area, and low-income house-
holds as those whose income is less than 50% of the metropolitan
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area. According to this definition, 25% of the families
in Newton fall into the moderate and low-income range, and 15%
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of this group is classified as low-income. The largest
proportion of low and moderate-income families are found
in the north of the city. The area with the lowest median
family income (10,699) is Nonantum, which also has the largest
number of non-English speaking (Italian) residents. 2 2 7
Like many suburban areas, Newton does not have a broad
history of federal categorical grants, so unlike its larger
urban neighbor, Newton can look upon HCDA funds as a bonus
rather than a replacement for lost federal monies. This fact
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means among other things that the less than middle-income
neighborhoods interested in impacting CDAS in were competing
for new opportunities, as opposed to ways to hold onto hard
won gains. This distinction is important, because as will
be explained in the following subsection on Roxbury, the
principle issue in urban areas served by HUD programs
consolidated under the Housing and Community Development
Act has been now to maintain threatened services and keep
community agencies alive.
Organized interest groups in Newton have not played as
pressured a political role in the Newton application process
as they did in Boston. The stakes were not as high, and
there is not the same sense of disenfranchisement which is
often the most compelling organizational catalyst. In
Newton there is greater community trust in city officials
and reliance on established decision-making structures.
As a result there was not evidenced a great deal of dis-
content with community relegation to an essentially advisory
role.
The Newton City Charter gives the responsibility for
preparation of comprehensive plans, such as the HCDA Com-
munity Development Plan to the Planning Department. The
director of that Department, Charles Thomas, was -assigned~
the task of coordinating preparation of the Community Devel-
opment Plan, in consultation with Newton citizens and the
city's.Planning Board. The major structured, point of inter-
vention for citizens in the preparation of the plan, was a
I.
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series of three hearings from November 1974 to February 1975,
sponsored and precided over by the Planning Board. The
Planning Department did a conscientious job of mailing out
information materials, explaining the Act and its require-
ments, as well as steps which citizens could take to make
known their priorities.
The first public hearing, in November was devoted to
identification of community needs. Before the meeting,
Thomas sent copies of the Mayor's Community Development
proposal to 400 community groups and 100 individuals in
the city. The mailing package included a discription of the
Act. All materials were printed in English and- Italian. 2 2 8
Turnout at the first hearing was disappointing, consider-
ing the extent of the Planning Department's preparations.
The forty people who came were mostly from existing social
service agencies, many of whom had not realized the bias
of the Act towards housing, and consequently the ineligibility
of some of their proposals. The Planning Board used that
occasion to distribute housing and census data and to present
a survey form designed to obtain more community input for the
development of the final plan.2 2 9
Between the first and second hearings, Thomas and his
staff drew up a report which would serve as the framework
for the official'plan. Included in this report was the
identification of needs in the areas of housing rehabilitation,
design of the physical environment, housing and auxiliary
4,
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social services, and expansion of economic activity. These
needs were determined to be most crucial in certain sections
of the city, i.e., Newton Corner, Nonantum, and parts of
West Newton. The three target areas were named on the basis
of eight indicators: (1) housing units over 35 years old,
(2) occupied units lacking plumbing, (3) overcrowded units,
(4) households paying more than 25% of their income in rent,
(5) persons 60 years of age and older, (6) families with
female heads, (7) low-income families, and (8) median income
families. 231
The community attendance at the second hearing almost
doubled that of the first. The target areas were presented
and the Planning Board asked for suggestions for other program
components. Interestingly enough two of the target communities
named by the Planning Department had very different reactions
to the preliminary proposal. Nonantum had been suggested
by both the Planning Department and the Planning Board as a
potential site for additional low cost housing. Nonantum
residents came out in force to declare their opposition to
this suggestion. Newton Corner residents, on the other hand,
saw the availability of HCDA funds as a change to reviVe
their community organization and take a few project ideas
down off the shelf.2 3 2
As it happens, Newton Corner was the only neighborhood
in the city to organize a citizens group expressly for the
purpose of dealing with CDRS. Two other communities in
I.
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Newton Highlands and Newton Upper Falls had ongoing organiza-
tions which added CDRS to their list ofsconcerns. Newton
Corner had history of citizen participation efforts, but
all of these died out after a specific issue was settled.
The prospect of HCDA funds presented another chance for
group involvement.
The Newton Corner group really got going after the
third public hearing and the completion of the city's
Community Development Plan, in January. Their first monthly
meetings in March and in April were devoted to laying the
groundwork for a Newton Corner Village Council which would
do long range planning for traffic and pedestrian safety,
street lights, business support, housing and community
services and advocacy planning. By late April a temporary
steering committee had been set up and subcommittees had
been formed to deal with each of the above areas of interest.2 3 3
For the Newton Corner Village Council, then, CDRS
was really a point of departure to coalesce around a range
of neighborhood goals. The city Planning Department director
was a welcomed part of the organization process. In contrast
to the Boston neighborhood groups who got together to counter-act
the mayors control of CDRS via Little City Halls, the Newton
Corner Group saw themselves as much more of an adjunct to
the city decision-making procedure, and not a countervailing
force.
158
4. Roxbury - The Roxbury Neighborhood Develop-
ment Council.
Unlike the people of Newton Corner, Roxbury
residents responded to the advent of HCDA funds almost immediate-
ly after the mayor's announcement. At the first public hearing
on CDRS, one of the 18 scheduled around the city, the public
turnout was large.234 People from all over the area crowded
into the Roxbury YMCA to find out just what CDRS was and how
their agencies and organizations could be dealt in on the fund-
ing. Many were concerned about the fate of Model Cities
under CDRS, and the prospects for survival of the small
projects which have been supported under that program.
Others not connected to ongoing activities wanted to know
what new kinds of endeavors would be eligible under HCDA.2 3 5
Though Issac Graves, the head of the Roxbury Little City Hall
who presided that day, was more than willing to deal with
all of these issues, the meeting had to be adjourned.
There -was no Spanish-speaking interpreter present to trans-
late for that contingent of the attendants, and all of the
prepared explanatory materials were printed in English.2 3 6
The language barrier was overcome by the next public
meeting, and the same set of issues surfaced, in addition
to questions about housing demolition and rehabilitation.
As in some other neighborhoods, people in Roxbury ex-
pressed their doubts about the ability of the mayor's
Neighborhood Development Council to incorporate community
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priorities. The general consensus of the gathering that
night was that they should form their oyn local council of
elected representatives who would function as official
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spokesmen for Roxbury's priorities.
A temporary council was formed and headed by Dan
Richardson, former head of the Model Neighborhood Board,
until formal elections could be held. The temporary council
was to decide-CDRS priorities for Roxbury, in time for
submission of Boston's application, and the permanent council
would see to it that these agenda items were carried out,
once the funding arrived. As envisioned by its founders,
the permanent Roxbury Neighborhood Development Council (RNDC)
would function as an information center in the community, and
a clearinghouse for important data being cycled in from
downtown, and between agencies in the area. In addition
to acting as a liaison with the mayor's NDC, the RNDC
would be the implement'or of programs under local CDRS
funds. It was also thought that the RNDC would seek
and
alternative sources of funding,sact as a support group for
the CDC of Boston in its plans for an industrial park. In
its role as community organizer, the RNDC wanted to help
former members of the Model Cities Administration to find jobs. 2 38
By late January, the permanent RNDC had been elected,
with Richardson as Chairman. Comprised mostly of heads of
small.agencies whose programs faced de-funding,239 the Council
turned its attention to the formulation of contihgency plans
to support existing services. Richard Badillo from the
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Alianza Hispana is typical of RNDC members. His agency
was formerly financed almost solely by Model Cities until
that source was cut. The Alianza was able to get a little
money this year from the United Way, but a major funding
proposal sent to HEW was turned down, leaving the organiza-
tion in dire straights. For Badillo, the RNDC represented
a way of joining other agencies representatives in similar
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predicaments in a combined search for a solution.
Housing has also been an important issue confronting
the RNDC. Among their primary requests for expenditure of
HCDA funds were measures to prevent foreclosure of 4,500
endangered housing units ,to begin demolition and boarding
up programs, and to provide financial assistance for
low and moderate income families in need of adequate shelter.2 4 1
As Dan Richardson, from his viewpoint as head of the
permanent council saw it, the RNDC grew out of local people's
concern about short-term funding for their programs.
Revenue sharing at the community level was a "hot new
issue" which people discontent with their dealings with
City Hall, seized upon as a way of keeping their operations
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going. Crucial to the survival of the RNDC as a fixture.
in the community is the ability of its members to expand
their scope beyond short-term financial issues,, and seek
to determine strategies larger than impacting one federal
243
program which will further neighborhood development. At
this writing it is not clear that RNDC has bridged that gap
between immediate and overall concerns. Though the arrival
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of HCDA money in the next couple of months will tell more
about the viability of the council as an indigeneous
mechanism for community involvement, events to date provide
the basis for a number of speculations.
Aside from its ability or inability to function from
a wider frame of reference, a decisive factor in the viability
of the RNDC is its relationship to the Model Neighborhood
Board, and indirectly to the Model Cities Administration.
During the phasing out of the Model Cities program and the
allocation of funds by the city to wind down operations,
the RNDC felt it important to monitor the activities of
both the agency and the MNB. Basically the RNDC was suspicious
of the administration of Model Cities funds, especially
when it examined the agency's budget and found that $2.5
million was earmarked for staff salaries but a smaller
figure $2.0 million for program support.244 The RNDC
felt that unless the Model Cities Administration itself
were just an employment program, that it was i.nappropriate
to allocate such a large amount for staff. As the weeks
went by, at least fifteen or twenty minutes of every RNDC
meeting was spent discussing new instances of "administrative
fat"in the Model Cities budget. Efforts to meet with
members of the agency who could explain budgetary alloca-
tions proved unsatisfactory.
Nor was the RNDC happy with the activities of the Model
Neighborhood Board. The RNDC held the general v'ew that
I.
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MNB members had been in office too long, and were too-
sympathetic to "the power structure downtown" to adequate-
ly represent Roxbury. It should be remembered that Richard-
son's long-standing disagreement with the MNB had not
diminished, and that as head of the RNDC he was not likely
to sublimate the interests of his new organization, to the
wishes of the board which forced his resignation. One
speculation that can be made is that among the unstated,
long-term goals of the RNDC was replacement of the MNB
in its role as representative of Roxbury. Whether or not
the RNDC can garner the community support and recognition
from City Hall to surplant the MNB remains to be seen.
Implications of Neighborhood Involvement In CDRS
Both the Roxbury and the Newton Corner experiences
with the pre-expenditure phases of CDRS have implications
for future neighborhood involvement in the program. Basically
these two examples suggest several differences in the ways
that white suburban, and inner-city low-income minority
communities respond to Special Revenue Sharing funds. These
differences can be grouped into four general categories,
i.e., socio-economic conditions, history of categorical grant
support and other citizen participation efforts,.and relation-
ship of the community organization to the local government.
(a) Socio-economic conditions.
Assuming that the general motivation underlying the
formation of the two citizens groups is the same, that is,
V
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establishing priorities for the use of community develop-
ment funds, the most important evidence-of their differing
economic situations would be the access to resources. Time
and money to formulate neighborhood plans are likely to be
more available in Newton than in Roxbury. The larger
number of women who do not work and who are therefore able
to volunteer efforts, has implications for the "person-
power" available to staff the citizen involvement process.
The fact that a greater percentage of Newton residents come
from professional backgrounds means that some forms of
technical assistance, particularly legal aid, need not be
imported. In fact, the presence of more than five local
lawyers at the first public meeting in Newton Corner meant
that interpretation of the HCDA legislation and HUD guide-
lines was accurate and more immediate than if no such
expertise had been on hand.
More than one community leader in Roxbury has told
me that extended funding schedules and postponed federal
deadlines can work in their community's favor. Though
concerned that the benefits of programs such as HCDA get
funneled into the neighborhoods as quickly as possible',
Roxbury leaders need time to identify and gather resources;
more time probably, than their more affluent qounterparts.
People working in blue-collar jobs, and female heads of
families have less time to spend in neighborhood meetings.
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Technical expertise is not as plentiful among the
general constituency of the RNDC, so in most instances
the Roxbury district planners from the BRA fulfilled this
function. Statistical data, maps, explanation of relevant
legislation were provided by the two black district planners.
Though clearly functioning in an advocacy role within the
BRA bureaucracy, the planners occasionally found themselves
limited in their ability to completely ally with the RNDC,
because they worked for the city. One of the more favorable
legacies of the 60's programs, however, is that most agency
people are sophisticated enough to appreciate the value of
having such advocates within the bureaucracy, and therefore
did not push the planners too far in their pro-community
position.
B. History of Categorical Grant Support and Other
Citizen Participation Efforts.
Unlike Newton Corner which has not had a long
history of categorical grant support and activist citizen
organizations, Roxbury joins many inner-city neighborhoods
in trying to weather the transition from the adversarial
politics of the 60's to the present era of political compro-
mise and coalition strategies. While Newton is faced with
the task of trying to sustain momentum to keep its citizen
group functioning, Roxbury must find a way to channel the
energies sparked by involvement in Model Cities and Community
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Actions plans into less cathartic, longer range participatory
tactics which will be successful in thecurrent revenue
sharing programs.
Issac Graves, the head of the Roxbury Little City
Hall, has a number of opinions about the ramifications of
this transition. The fact that the proliferation of
categorical grants is gone, has in his words "opened a
Pandora's box-of citizen participation". He feel that the
seeming abundance of specific grants in the 60's and the
heightened awareness of community representatives led to
an expectation of controversy, and an unrealistic view of
the boundaries of citizen power. Consequently Graves thinks
that it is now difficult for the same people to understand
the politics of scarcity, and the need for compromise in
instances where confrontation might previously have been
successful.
In Graves' view, 'it is crucial that the community be
kept informed so that they can (1) understand the need
for long term commitment, since the "one big noisy meeting"
tactic is of limited value, (2) get a larger perspective
on what may seem to be strictly neighborhood issues, in
order to successfully ally themselves with other community
groups, and (3) help produce thorough and inclusive plans
which will serv e'their own interests andimpress city
authorities.
I would add to Graves' conclusions about the legacy of
categorical grant support several other suppositions. The
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struggle for community self-determination which peaked in
the late sixties surfaced a number of respected leaders
who have continued to spearhead neighborhood planning
efforts. These leaders (and many of their constituents)
are now sophisticated in dealing with the bureaucracy and
have still maintained credibility in the community. Their
skills are an important resource, and their finely tuned
feedback systems are instrumental in judging and consolidat-
ing neighborhood sentiment.
Also, the existence of advocates within the bureaucracy,
such as Graves himself, is bound to have a positive effect
on Roxbury's negotiations with City Hall and the BRA.
Unlike categorical grants which are supervised by more
centralized control mechanisms, revenue sharing funds will
be handled in a de-centralized manner once they are appor-
tioned by the Mayor. The presence of minority elected
officials and bureaucrats helps mitigate the loss of bar-
gaining power for the community under revenue sharing programs,
by supporting the work of an intermediary structure such as
the RNDC in its dealings with the city government.
C. Relationship of Community Organizations to the Local
Government and Bureaucracy.
This last set of conclusions revolves around the
assumption that residents of Newton are more enfranchised,
closer to local governments officials, and therefore better
satisfied with the local status quo, than their Roxbury counter-
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parts. The Newton Citizens are presumably better able to
direct their input in development issues through established
decision-making structures. In the case of the Housing
and Community Development Act funds, the Newton Planning
Office, itself an advisory body, has been instrumental in
setting up local citizen groups such as the one now forming
in Newton Corner, and is currently helping those organiza-
tions to express their own goals and priorities.
Roxbury cannot boast of such active support, hence
the need for an intermediary body such as the RNDC. The
fact that Roxbury citizens are more removed from and have
less reason to trust traditional decision-making bodies in
their city means that the participation process is more
complex. Communications from City Hall must be scrutinized,
and responses made in careful fashion. The budget
procedures must be monitored closely and continual inves-
tigations made into the progress of fund application and
execution. Since individual Roxbury residents have less
clout with their city government, the citizen participation
effort must be broader-based and organized into specific
task forces.
The relationship of these organizations to their
local bureaucracies is a major determinant of what the
futures of the organizations will be. Charles Thomas, in
the Newton Planning Office feels that it is in his interest
to have an ongoing association with an indigeneous group
such as the Newton Corner Village Council. As long as
I.
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that Council can keep its activities and membership f.unction-
ing, they can expect to be bolstered in their efforts by
the local bureaucracy. This is the kind of interaction
which framers of GRS and Special Revenue Sharing had in
mind when they talked about citizen participation.
Those same legislators probably did not consider the
prospects for meaningful involvement of citizens in
communities like Roxbury. The future of the RNDC lies to
a large extent in its ability to withstand pressure
from the local government bureaucracy to function within
the traditional system. At the same time the RNDC cannot
afford to exist too far apart from the established bases
of power and decision-making )ecause in order to win out
over the MNB as chief implementator of CDRS funds in Roxbury,
the RNDC needs mayorial sanction. The MNB sees itself as
an equally viable representative group and is not anxious
to become extent. It 'is not inconceivable that once the
Model Cities program ends in July, the Board could re-
organize under another name and by virtue of past connections
become the Mayor's officially recognized community organiza-
tion in Roxbury. If this scenario comes true, the prospects
for the RNDC's future are dim indeed.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
IThe evidence thus far on revenue sharing is that it is
not suitable as the principle source of financial support
for cities, and that the program does not substantially
correct the difference in financial resources between local-
ities and the federal government. Not only has revenue shar-
ing failed to live up to the major fiscal goals for which
it was designed, but the program has proved negligent of
if not detrimental to the interest of people in low-income
and minority communities who can least afford a laissez-
faire stance on the part of the federal government.
Administrative guidelines in General and Special Revenue
Sharing offer few incentives for state and local governments
to reform regressive tax policies, or to try to strengthen
the management abilities of officials in their bureaucracies.
As first envisioned by Reuss in his early revenue sharing
scheme, such reform might widen the capacities of municipal
governments especially to deal more effectively with their
less advantaged constituents.
The inordinate difficulties which citizens face when
seeking to intervene at even an advisory level, speak to
the need for greater avenues of citizen participation.
One of the foremost lessons of the categorical grant ex-
perience is the importance of decisive federal support for
such participation.
11
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If GRS is to continue, and Congress is now preparing
to consider its extension, a number of major revisions are
in order. Aimed at strengthening administrative, and sub-
stantive weaknesses in the program, these revisions also
imply a shift in philosophy from total reliance on the de-
centralized united funding approach to an enlarged federal
role. Though the jury is still out on the efficacy of
Special Revenue Sharing, four years of GRS offer serious
doubts about the willingness of local governments to use
their unencumbered authority to redistribute resources
between the powerful and the poor.
Each section of the second and third chapters of this
paper considers a different aspect of the overall revenue
sharing program. The suggested revisions which follow
are formed in the same general sequence, and in most cases,
are summaries of the more detailed explanations included in
the body of the paper.
1. Revision of the methods by which funds are distributed.
The inequities in the allocation of GRS funds among
recipient jurisdictions begin with the distribution formula.
Revision of the formula must be focused at the formula
itself, as well as the data on-which it is based.
Removal of both the ceiling which states that no juris-
diction may receive per capita more than 145% of the state's
per capita entitlement, as well elimination of the floor
which says that no recipient can get less than 20% of the
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state's average per capita amount, would improve the formula
greatly. Without the ceiling the poorer jurisdictions would
qualify for more money. Marginally useful jurisdictions
would receive less support if the 20% floor were abolished,
and the'increment saved could go to needier jurisdictions.
Likewise, the eligibility requirements for recipient
governments also deserve re-thinking. Given the scarcity of
funds, it is wasteful to include non-functional jurisdictions
such as some midwestern townships and special purpose
districts, recipients for GRS money.
Adoption of at least the most fundamental suggestions
made by the Stanford Research Institute and Brookings
Institute studies would improve the data base for the GRS
formula. Federal proponents of the program should encourage
the Bureau of the Census to amplify its efforts to reduce
income misreporting bias and underenumeration, and also to
authorize enough funding so that sampling questionnaires
and aggregation can be designed to accomodate the needs of
revenue sharing. Long-term measures to perfect the data
base should also be seriously examined. These would hinge
on redesigning the 1980 census and scheduling more frequent
updating of figures through mid-decade censuses and inter-
censal estimates.
Compensation for the census undercount of poor people
and minorities is especially important. Since data calculations
on the part of the Census Bureau will be complex and time
consuming, ORS should be prodded to action its delegated
authority to use other available sources, including estimates,
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for a more accurate enumeration of undercounted groups.
All efforts to correct the undercount should not end
with the data base revisions. Either changes should be
made within the formula so that low-income urban areas
are counted more heavily, by way of a more effective poverty
indicator, or additional sums should be allocated to localities
with large low-income populations, once the base entitlement
is determined.
2. Expenditure of funds revisions.
The most compelling revisions on behalf of minorities
and the poor involve re-structuring for more social program
spending. Sanctions must be made operative which make it
advantageous for localities to consider the needs of the
economically depressed. Since so far low-income demands for
social welfare spending have usually lost out to middle-
income demands for tax relief, it is not clear that block
grants in any form are the proper vehicle to address the
needs of disenfranchised people. More targeted program
responses to the needs of the poor are in order which may
be instituted as adjuncts to the general and special revenue
sharing program.
In his forthcoming book on the legacy of the Model
Cities Program, Professor Charles Haar of Harvard offers
several intriguing suggestions for the co-existence of block
and categorical funding schemes. Haar posits a bri-partite
approach to federal urban aid which ideally fosters an
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interplay between national policies such as low-income relief,
.1
and local initiative on a case by case basis. Haar's
suggestion is to continue General Revenue Sharing as a way
of maintaining the financial viability of cities trapped
in a fiscal crunch. He would also continue Special Revenue
Sharing block grants, but in a significantly modified form
so that they could be better directed to help specific
client groups. The third step in the Haar approach
would be to reinstate categorical grants to support continued
experimentation with innovative social programs, and to
improve the local management capacity upon which the whole
system will depend.2
Tax reform and general commitment to progressivity are
important issues for the overall framework in which revenue
sharing operates. The basic notion of aiding the have-nots
more than the haves cannot be limited to one federal program.
Similarly, even the most progressive of programs cannot begin
to right the wrongs of a staunchly regressive system.
Comprehensive measures such as these cannot be accomplished
piece-meal by localities. Only national domestic policies
instigated and sustained at the federal level can be sufficient
catalysts for income redistribution and tax reforms.
Expenditure revisions within the GRS programs. should
focus on the current funding loopholes. One of the problems
with the priority expenditure categories is that it has
been possible for localities to reallocate monies in such
a way that revenue sharing funds are actually used for
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purposes -other than priority categories. In one of the few
cases to go to court, Mathews v. Massell, such re-allocation
practices were challenged.3
The plaintiffs in this suit, the citizens and taxpayers
of the city of Atlanta, challenged their Mayor's plans to
use a portion of the city's own funds, which had been freed-
up thanks to GRS funds, in order to make a rebate to those
with water and sewer accounts. Mayor Massell intended to
make the rebate possible by paying firemen's salaries with
entitlement funds, a permissable GRS expenditure, and then
fransferring money from a general fund earmarked for firemen's
salaries to Atlanta's water and sewer fund,
The court's holding stated that while the State and
Local Fiscal Assistance Act did not specifically impose any
restrictions on the use of legitimately freed-up funds,
there is a difference between legitimately freed-up funds
and those which are tr'ansferred from one account to another
to avoid priority expenditure categories.4
The city of Atlanta's transgression was fairly obvious
and occurred early in the operation of GRS. There is some
reason to believe that the Mayor underestimated the import
of priority categories and thought his actions were justified.
However, the fact that the subsequent court ruling made
clear that such actions were illegal does not mean that
other .localities haven't succeeded in maximizing the fungi-
bility of GRS money. Profiting from Massell's mistake, their
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procedures are likely to be more sophisticated than
obvious bookkeeping tactics. There is still a need for
priority expenditure categories and guidelines to be
strengthened and made explicit, in order to ensure that
expenditures are made in the areas of greatest need.
Unfortunately toughening of priority expenditure
categories is exactly opposite from the direction in which
the current Ford Administration is heading. Earlier this
year, a Ford appointed task force made a number of recom-
mendations to the Chief Executive as to the tact he should
use in prosecuting the extension of revenue-sharing before
the upcoming 94th Congress. Realizing that at this point
in time the greatest support for the program comes from
state and local officials who enjoy freedom from Federal
restrictions, one of the major recommendations made by the
task force is that priority expenditure categories be abolished
altogether.5 Deletion of priority areas would mean that
localities would have total discretion in the way that funds
are spent, and that the few expenditure controls which now
function to increase public accountability, would no longer
exist.
3. Civil Rights Enforcement.
It is essential that the Office of Revenue Sharing be
allocated staff, resources, and compliance authority
comensurate with the crucial responsibility of enforcing
civil rights provisions. Compliance reviews by that Office
I.
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have been cursory, data collection methods naive and the
Director of ORS himself has testified that until very recently
few special efforts had been made to inform the public
of appropriate complaint procedures.
The passive approach to civil rights compliance
taken by ORS is inexcusable. Despite that Office's contentions
to the contrary, aggressive compliance reviews cannot be
posed as a trade-off for local government flexibility, and
consequently as an excuse for federal laxity. The first
item on ORS' agenda should be to make full use of enforce-
ment authority which it already has, in order to make
sure that local spending decisions do not violate civil
rights regulations.
In addition, the Office should also be provided with
more manpower, womanpower and money to fulfill its duties.
The current underfunded, understaffed operation provides a
convenient explanatiorr for inaction.
ORS also needs to be equipped with sanctions that fall
somewhere inbetween total de-funding of non-complaint
jurisdictions, and continued support of impermissable
activities. In deciding whether or not to cut off funds
local governments, officials in that Office have complained
that these remedies are too severe. The unwillingness to
employ such sanctions is not a new theme on the part of
federal bureaucrats. A former assistant secretary of HUD
once explained, "We are roughly in the position of fighting
11
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a brush war when all we have is atom bombs."6 Likewise, is
ORS's reluctance to wipe out a locality which is out of line
with technical guidelines.
4. Citizen Participation.
The heightened public awareness of the actions of their
local officials which revenue-sharing was supposed to spark,
has not materialized. Average citizens do not instantly
take it upon themselves to pick up where the federal govern-
ment has left, and launch extensive monitoring activities.
Even interest groups organized expressly for the purpose of
tracking local GRS expenditures have found it extremely
difficult to find out what is going on with their budgetary
processes.
If average middle-class, majority citizens find it
difficult to intervene in local decision-making procedures,
then it goes without saying that low-income and minority
client groups are at an even greater disadvantage. The
only recourse is to make substantive, not advisory participa-
tion by both groups a federal regulation, with emphasis on
the latter. This revenue sharing has not done. Those OEO-CAP
programs which were successful have shown how effective the
federal lever can be in empowering disenfranchised people.
What is needed is more than a repetition of the "maximum
feasible participation" clause. Federal support for citizen
participation must be policy-oriented, that is mandated
legislatively, explained and enforced administratively and
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supported financially. A concise but comprehensive policy
for citizen participation in all federal programs should be
defined, so that neither citizens nor local officials are
subject to inconsistent, short-term participation policies
which characterized the 60's.
A thorough federal policy for citizen participation
encompasses a number of key factors. It recognizes the basic
right of citizens to take part in the implementation of
programs that affect them, in ways that extend beyond the
right to vote for elected officials. It also recognizes
that even the vote cannot be totally effective in the case
of economically depressed citizens who are a numerical minority
locally.
In recognizing the right to participate and the obstacles
which impede that right, a thorough federal policy would
enact a comprehensive program of public education for citizens
and program officials, which makes clear the intricacies
and innovative possibilities inherent in each program.
Perhaps local administrators would become less fearful of
community intervention if they anticipated federal rewards
for co-operative effects. Similarly, local people previously
denied access to decision-making might better be able to
develop participation skills and ongoing relationships with
the immediate power structure, if they were confident even
that their basic right to be included were federally insured.
A public information component would school,budget of-
ficials, for example, on how to incorporate lay people into
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what has usually been a closed process. Technical as-sistance
to client groups on the procedures of budget making would
enable them to meet the bureaucrats halfway. An ideal
citizen participation policy would acknowledge the need for
neutrality in technical assistance, and the danger of send-
ing in experts to coerce people on behalf of vested interests.
Substantive citizen participation costs money. For
people who work all day for modest wages, and who have
families at home, involvement in time-consuming citizens
groups can be costly and self-defeating, regardless of
intensity of the interest. Not only should funds be made
available to support such efforts, but the workload assigned
to citizens groups should be appropriate for policy-making
and not staff oriented functions. Membership on officially
recognized citizen boards should be rotated frequently enough
to recycle opinions through the community and to foster
representation of a spectrum of indigeneous constituencies.
In creating federal aid programs with impacts as pro-
found as General and Special Revenue Sharing, the federal
government must acknowledge that its fundamental responsibil-
ity is two-fold.
Complex fiscal issues such as those which revenue
sharing has sought to address demand strong national direction
and an active commitment to see that those goals are met.
The federal government's duty cannot end once the entitle-
ment checks are mailed out to the States. Enfordement
measures to see that policy guidelines are followed in
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national programs should not be confused as being unwarranted
interference with state and local sovereignty. Many local
governments seem either unable or unwilling to respond to
the needs of the poor. Racial minorities still are fight-
ing external limitations on their social and economic status.
Therefore, the federal government must resume its role as
an active advocate, as a matter of public policy, constitu-
tional and statutory law.
The other fundamental tenet of the federal responsibility
must be to assure that the funding level is adequate to insure
the viability of the program. The loftiest of goals and
most aggressive of enforcement tactics cannot correct the
weaknesses of an underfunded national effort. GRS funds
have been spread too thinly , and Special Revenue Sharing
has consolidated too many programs at a reduced financial
level, for either of these approaches to maximize their
potential.
In abdicating its compliance enforcement role to the
local units of government, federal officials have placed too
large a burden on citizens to monitor the program. Generally
local governments become accountable to their constituents
when it is in their interests to do so. The lax expenditure
requirements of revenue sharing do not make it necessary to
incorporate citizen priorities. Low-income people and
minorities especially, require additional assurance of
national level support, and access to resources which will
enable them to mount their own agendas for intervention.
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COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT, PROGRAM BUDGET
Housing Programs:
- Mayor's Housing Improvement Program
- Public Housing Improvements
(Boston Housing Authority)
- Special Housing Programs
- Clearance of abandoned, unsafe, and
dangerous buildings
- Securing of vacant buildings for future
rehabilitation
- Restoration and improvement of vacant
lots in residential areas
Neighborhood Business District Program:
- Capital improvements in commercial centers
- Parks
- Lights
- Tree planting
- Street reconptruction
- Parking lots
- Demolition
- Feasibility and design
- Acquisition of real property
- Acquisition for site improvements
- Matching share funds for Traffic Operations
Program to Increase Capacity & Safety
(TOPICS)
- Counselling service for local businessmen
- Footpatrolmen'
- Storefront revitalization program
$10, 000, 000
$4, 200, 000
3,000,000
300, 000
2, 500, 000
1,300,000
42, 585
186, 245
52, 954
26,477
355,678.
42, 585
106, 277
354, 814
132,385
200,000
50, 000
350, 000
100, 000
Neighborhood Capital Improvements
- Parks $
- Lights
- Tree planting
- Street reconstruction
- Sidewalks
- Building renovation and
expansion
- Feasibility and design
- Acquisition of real property
- Acquisition for site
improvements
Urban Renewal Activities
Human Services /Model Cities Activities
Direct Administrative Overhead
Reserve for Contingencies (as specified in
the Act)
TOTAL
($5, 050,000)
473, 544
2, 331, 831
356, 363
183, 578
791,510
786, 010
52, 954
21, 256
52, 954
$6, 900, 000
$2, 550, 000
$850, 000
$3, 000, 000
$30, 300, 000
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COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT REVENUE SHARING
ELIGIBLE ACTIVITES
1. Acquisition of real property
2. Acquisition, construction or reconstruction of:
a. Neighborhood facilities
b. Senior centers
c. Historic properties
d. Utilities
e. Streets
f. Street lights
g. Water and sewer facilities
h. Foundation & platforms for air right sites
i. Pedestrian malls and walkwaysj. Parks, playgrounds and other facilities for recreational
participation, excluding facilities primarily for spectators
k. Flood and drainage facilities
1. Parking facilities
m. Solid waste disposal facilities
n. Fire protection services and facilities
3. Code.enforcement
4. Clearance, demolition and removal of buildings and improvements
5. Rehabilitation of buildings and improvements, including financing of
privately owned properties.
6. Removal of architectural barriers for the elderly and handicapped.
7. Payments for rent losses incurred while holding units to be used
for relocation.
8. Disposition of acquired land or retention for public purposes.
9. Public services concerned with emplovment, economic development,
crime prevention, child care, health, drug abuse, education, welfare,
recreatio'n, or coordination of development, in areas where needed to
support other eligible activities being undertaken and where other
federal funds are unavailable.
10. Completion of urban renewal projects.
11. Relocation payments
12. Development of a comprehensive community development plan and of a
p6licy-planning-mangement capacity for determining needs, setting
goals, devising programs, evgluating progress, and managing and
monitoring activities.
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13. Administrative costs for planning and execution of community
development and housing activities, including citizen participation.
INELIGIBLE ACTIVITIES
1. Public fac'ilities unless specifically mentioned; for example,
municipal buildings, stadiums, sports arenas, auditoriums, concert
halls, cultural and art centers, convention centers, museums,
schools, transportation facilities, hospitals.
2. Operating and maintenance expenses.
3. General government expenses.
4. Political activities.
5. New housing construction.
6. Income payments for housing or any other purposes.
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